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false and malicious, and continued, "the publication of such charges
by sending them to other parties to lie read or by printing them
in the newspapers, is by the laws of this state a criminal offence;
and if the jury believe frdm the evidence in the case that Hanford
was the author'of that article, and he sent it to Van Osdel for the
purpose of having it made public, then Hanford was guilty of an
offence made criminal by the laws of this state. It was the clear
legal light and it was the duty of Sullivan to protect his wife against
those charges; it was his right and it was his duty to, if possible,
suppress their publication, and to demand from their author an
explanation or a retraction," &c.
The jury could hardly fail to understand this instruction, as
applied to the facts, to mean, that the defendant had the legal right
to protect his wife against those charges in the way he did, to wit,
by shooting down the author of them.
The acquittal of the defendant upon such ruling is not surprising. But the defendant cannot be justified. Admitting all that his
counsel claii for him in the evidence in the way of provocation and
mitigating "circumstances, still the irresistible conclusion is, that
there was no necessity upon him, either real or apparent, for the
killing of Hanford, and therefore at least he was guilty of man.
slaughter, and of that crime an intelligent public opinion can never
CHAS. H. WooD.
hold him guiltless.
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A policy of insurance taken out by husband and wire, on their joint lives for the
benefit of the survivor, is not impaired by a subsequent divorce, even where there
are no issue of the marriage.
An insurance on life is not a contract of indemnity, and it Is valid, if there is in
good faith an insurable interest as the time of the making of the policy, though it
afterwards changes in amount or ceases altogether,
Any reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit or advantage from the continued life of another, creates an insurable interest in such lire.
An attorney is not a competent witness In a United States court to testify to
facts communicated to him by a client in his professional capacity, although be
would be competent by the law of the state in which such court may be sitting.
The rules of evidence in the federal courts, not affecting rights of property are
under the control of Congress, and the Acts of Congress have made communications between counsel and client privileged.
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IN error to the Circuit Court of the'United States for the
Southern District of Ohio.
This was an action on a policy of life assurance issued July 25th
1868, on the joint lives of George F. and Francisca Schaefer (then
husband and wife), payable to the survivor on the death of either.
In January 1870, they were divorced and alimony was decreed
and paid to the wife; and there was never any issue of the marriage. They both subsequently married again, after which, in February 1871, George F. Schaefer died. This action was brought
by Francisca, the survivor.
On the trial of the cause several exceptions were taken by the
defendant (the insurance company) to the rulings and charge of the
court, and this writ of error was brought to reverse the judgment
for alleged error in said rulings and charge.
George ifoadley and Edgar M. Johnson, for plaintiff in error.
George -D. Brannan, for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-The first exception was for overruling certain
testimony offered by the defendant. The plaintiff having offered
herself as a witness,-on her cross-examination admitted that she
had employed one Harris as her attorney to file her petition for
divorce; and being questioned whether she had not stated to him,
to be embodied in the petition, that Schaefer had been an habitual
drunkard for a period of more than three years prior to the date
of filing the petition, denied that she had so stated to him. (Had
such been the fact it would have falsified the statement made in the
application for insurance.) The defendant called Harris, and asked
him whether the plaintiff had not -so stated to him on that occasion.
The question was objected to and overruled as calling for confidential communications between attorney and client. The defendant
alleges that herein the court erred, because, by the law of Ohio
such communications are not privileged. An examination of the
Ohio statutes renders it doubtful whether the law is as the defendant contends. But if it were, the court did right to exclude the
testimony. The laws of the state are only to be regarded as rules
of decision in the courts of the United States where the constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States have not otherwise
provided. When the latter speak they are controlling; that is to
BRADLEY,
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say, on all subjects on which it is competent for them to speak.
There can be no doubt that it is competent for Congress to declare
the rules of evidence which shall prevail in the courts of the United
States, not affecting rights of property; and where Congress has
declared the rulb, the state law is silent. Now, the competency of
parties as witnesses in the federal courts depends on the Act of Congress in that behalf, passed in 1864, amended in 1865, and codified
in the Revised Statutes, sect. 858. It is not derived from the
statute of Ohio, and is not subject to the conditiois and qualifications imposed thereby. The only conditions and qualifications
which Congress deemed necessary are expressed in the Act of Congress; and the admission in evidence of previous communications
to counsel is not one of them. And it is to be hoped that it will
not soon be made such. The protection of confidential communications made to professional advisers is dictated by a wise and liberal policy. If a person cannot consult his legal adviser without
being liable to have the interview made public the next day by an
examination enforced by the courts, the law would be little short
of despotic. It would be a prohibition upon professional advice
and assistance.
The other exceptions were to the charge of the court, and relate
to two points ; first, to the forbearance note given for a portion of
the last renewal premium, and, secondly, to the alleged failure of
interest of the plaintiff in the policy caused by the divorce of the
insured parties.
First: as to' the forbearance note. Only one-half of the annual
premium was required to be paid in cash ; the insured, if they chose,
could have a credit for the other half. This credit was given upon
the assured's signing an acknowledgment in the following form: "I
hereby acknowledge a credit or forbearance of dollars of the
premium on my policy No. -, which amount shall be a lien on
said policy at 6 per cent. per annum until paid or adjusted by return of surplus premium." It was not a note promising to pay
money; but a form of acknowledgment by which the assured consented to a deduction from the policy for non-payment of a portion
of the premium. As long as George F. Schaefer took any interest
in the policy he signed this acknowledgment for himself and wife,
" George F. and Franz. Schaefer ;" or for himself alone. One
premium became due after the divorce, and Francisca Schaefer
herself attended to the payment of it,-paying the cash portion,
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and authorizing her son to sign the forbearance note, as it is called.
He did so in the name of both parties insured, thus: "George F.
& C.1 Schaefer." The company accepted it. On whatvalid ground
they can now object to the transaction, it is difficult to see. A
joint act was to be done. Only one of the parties could physically
do it. Either had a right to do it. This act was, to pay or settle
the annual premium. The plaintiff, as one of the joint parties,
performed what was necessary to be done. George F. Schaefer
could not complain; for it was done in his interest, keeping the
policy alive for his benefit as well as Francisca's. The company
could not complain, for they accepted both the money and the
acknowledgment in the form in which they were given. There is
no pretence that any deception was practised upon them.
This point is really frivolous.
The other point, relating to the alleged cessation of insurable
interest by reason of the divorce of the parties, is entitled to more
serious consideration, although we have very little difficulty in disposing of it.
It will be proper, in the first place, to ascertain what is an insurable interest. It is generally agreed that mere wager policies, that
is, policies in which -the insured party has no interest whatever in
the matter insured, but only an interest in its loss or destruction,
are void as against public policy. This was the law of England
prior to the Revolution of 1688; but after that period a course of
decisions grew up sustaining wager policies. The legislature finally
interposed and prohibited such insurance; first with regard to marine risks, by statute of 19 Geo. II., c. 37 ; and next with regard
to lives, by the statute of 14 Geo. III., c. 48. In this country,
statutes to the same effect have been passed in some of the states,
but where they have not been, in most cases either the English
statutes have been considered as operative, or the older common
law has been followed. But precisely what interest is necessary in
order to take a policy out of the category of mere wager, has been
the subject of much discussion. In marine and fire insurance the
difficulty is not so great, because there insurance is considered as
strictly an indemnity. But in life insurance the loss can seldom
be measured by pecuniary values. Still an interest of some sort in
the insured life must exist. A man cannot take out insurance on
I "C." is evidently a mistake in the record for II F."

896

CONNECTICUT M1UTUAL LIFE INS. CO. r. SCHAEFER.

the life of a total stranger, nor on that of one who is not so connected
with him as to make the continuance of the life a matter of some
real interest to him.
It is well settled that a man has an insurable interest in his own
life, and in that'of his wife and children; a woman in the lifo of
her husband; and the creditor in the life of his debtor. Indeed, it
may be said generally that any reasonable expectation of pecuniary
benefit or advantage from the continued life of another creates an
insurable interest in such life. And there is no doubt that a man
may effect an insurance on his own life for the benefit of a relative
or friend; or two or more persons, on their joint lives, for the
benefit of the survivor or survivors. The old tontines were based
substantially on this principle, and their validity has never been
called in question.
The essential thing is, that the policy shall be obtained in good
faith, and not for the purpose of speculating upon the hazard of a
life in which the insured has no interest. On this point, the remarks
,f Chief Justice SuAw, in a case which arose in Connecticut (in
which state the present policy originated), seem to us characterized
by great good sense. He says: "In discussing the question in
this Commonwealth (Massachusetts) we are to consider it solely as
a question of common law, unaffected by the statute of 14 Geo. III.,
passed about the time of the commencement of the Revolution, and
never adopted in this state. All, therefore, which it seems necessary
to show, in order to take the case out of the objection of beinga
wager policy, is that the insured has some interest in the ceatui que
vie; that his temporal affairs, his just hopes and well-grounded expectations of support, of patronage and advantage in life will be
impaired; so that the real purpose is not a wager, but to secure
such advantages, supposed to depend on the life of another; such,
we suppose, would be sufficient to prevent it from being regarded
as a mere wager. Whatever may be the nature of such interest,
and whatever the amount insured, it can work no injury to the
insurers, because the premium is proportioned to the amount; and
whether the insurance be a large or small amount, the premium is
computed to be a precise equivalent for the risk taken. We cannot
doubt," he continues, "that a parent has an interest in the life of
a child, and, vice ver8a, a child in the life of a parent; not merely
on the ground of a provision of law that parents and grandparents
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are bound to support their lineal kindred when they stand in need
of relief, but upon considerations of strong morals, and the force of
natural affection between near kindred, operating often more efficaciously than those of positive law :" Loomis v. Eagle Life Insurance

Co., 6 Gray 899. We concur in these views, and deem it unnecessary to cite further authorities, all those of importance being collected and arranged in the recent treatises on the subject: See
May on Insurance, sects. 102-111; Bliss on Life Insurance, sects.
20-81."
The policy in question might, in our opinion, be sustained as a
joint insurance, without reference to any other interest, or to the
question whether the cessation of interest avoids a policy good at its
inception. 'We do not hesitate to say, however, that a policy taken
out in good faith and valid at its inception, is not avoided by the
cessation of the insurable interest, unless such be the necessary
effect of the provisions of the policy itself. Of course, a. colorable
or merely temporary interest would present circumstances from
which want of good faith and an intent to evade the rule might be
inferred. And in cases where the insurance is effected merely by
way of indemnity, as where a creditor insures the life of his debtor,
for the purpose of securing his debt, the amount of insurable interest
is the amount of the debt.
:But supposing a fair and proper insurable interest, of whatever
kind, to exist at the time of taking out the policy, and that it be
taken out in good faith, the object and purpose of the rule which
condemns wager policies is sufficiently attained; and there is then
no good reason why the contract should not be carried out according
to its terms. This is more manifest where the consideration is
liquidated by a single premium paid in advance, than where it is distributed in annual payments during the insured life. But, in any
case, it would be very difficult, after the policy had continued for
any considerable time, for the courts, without the aid of legislation,
to attempt an adjustment of equities arising from a cessation of
interest in the insured life. A right to receive the equitable value
of the policy would probably come as near to a proper adjustment
as any that could be devised. But if the parties themselves do not
provide for the contingency, the courts cannot do it for them.
In England by the operation of the statute of 14 Geo. III., as
construed by the courts, the law has assumed a very definite form.
In a lucid judgment delivered by Baron PARKE in the Exchequer
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Chamber in the case of Dalby v. Life Ins. Co., decided in 1854,
15 C. B. 365, it Was held that the true meaning of the statute is,
that there must be an interest at the time the insurance is effected,
but that it need not continue until death; the words of the statute
being, "that no insurance shall be made on a life or lives wherein
the assured shall have no interest, or by way of gaming or wagering,"
and "that in all cases where the insured hath interest in such life,
&c., no greater sum shall be recovered than the amount or value of
the interest." The word "hath" was construed as necessarily
referring to the time of effecting the insurance, and not to the time
of the death ; that being the only construction which would subserve
the object of the statute to discourage wagering, render the contract
uniform and certain, and preserve a fixed relation between the
premiums and the amount insured, as required by the principles
of life assurance. This case overruled the previous case of Good8all
v. Boldero, 9 East 72, decided by Lord ELLENBOROUGH, in which,

proceeding upon the idea that life insurance is a mere contract of
indemnity, it was held that the interest must continue until death,
and even until the bringing of the action. Baron PARKE, in commenting upon this case, very justly says: "Upon considering this
case, it is certain that Lord ELLENBOROUGH decided it upon the

assumption that a life policy was in its nature a mere contract of
indemnity, as policies on marine risks, and against fire, undoubtedly
are; and that the action was, in point of law, founded on the supposed damnification, occasioned by the death of the debtor, existing
at the time of the action brought; and his lordship relied upon the
decision of Lord MANSFIELD in Hfamilton v. Mendes, 2 Burr.
1270, that the plaintiff's demand was for an indemnity only. Lord
MANSFIELD was speaking of a policy against marine risks, which
is in its terms a contract for indemnity only. But that is not the
nature of what is termed an assurance for life :'it really is what it
is on the face of it-a contract to pay a certain sum in the event
of death. It is valid at common law; and, if it is made by a person
having an interest in the duration of the life it is not prohibited by
the statute."
As thus interpreted we might almost regard the English statute
as declaratory of the original common law, and as indicating the
proper rule to be observed in this country, where that law furnishes
the only rule of decision.
Be this, however, as it may, in our judgment a life policy, origi-
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nally valid, does not cease to be so by the cessation of the assured
party's interest in the life assured.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.
I. The decision of the court upon the
first point raised in this case is apparently in conflict with the last clause
of section 858 of the Revised Statutes
of the United States. That section provides that "In the courts of the United
States no witness shall be excluded in
any action on account of color, or iu
any civil action because he is a party to
or interested in the issue tried: Provided, that in actions by or against
executors, administrators or guardians,
in which judgment may be rendered for
or against them, neither party shall be
allowed to testify against the other as
to any transaction with or statement by
the testator, intestate or ward, unless
called to testify thereto by the opposite
party or required to testify thereto by
the court. , In all otber respects, the
laws of the state in which the court is
held shall be the rules of decision as to
the competency of witnesses in the
courts of the United States, in trials at
6ommon law and in equity and admiralty."
The Code of Civil Procedure of Ohio
provided (sect. 314) that certain classes
of persons should be incompetent to
testify, and, among others, "an attorney concerning any communication
made to him in that relation, or his
advice thereon, without th6 client's
consent."
Sect. 315 provided that "if a person
offer himself as a witness, that is to be
deemed a consent to the examination
also of an attorney * * * on the same
subject."
The doubt expressed by the court as
to the present state of the law in Ohio
arose from the fact that an amendment
to sect. 314, passed in 1870, inserted
the word "express" in the 314th sect.
before ihe words "client's consent,"

and also because the amendment made
various other changes in the original
sect. 314, which tended to show an
intention of the legislature to repeal
sect. 315 of the Code.
At first sight it would seem that the
last clause of sect. 858 of the Revised
Statutes of the United States would
oblige the federal courts to follow the
state law as to the competency of an
attorney to testify as to communications made by "the client, in case the
client had himself given evidence. But
the decision of the Supreme Court is
maintainable on two grounds; first,
because the question is not really one
as to the competency of a witness, but as
to the admissibility of a certain kind
of testimony. The attorney is a competent witness, but the common law
of the United States forbids him to
divulge in court communications made
to him in his capacity of attorney. The
last clause of sect. 858 does not require
the United Stales courts to follow the
laws of the states relating to the rules
of evidence, but is limited to the state
laws regarding the competency of witnesses. It being the law of the federal
courts that confidential communications
to attorneys shall be protected, no state
can by statute impose a different rule
on the courts of the United States. Second, the provisions of the 315th sect.
of the Ohio Code are in derogation of
the first clause of sect. 858 of the Revised Statutes of the United States,
which declares that in civil actions no
witness shall be excluded because he is
a party to or interested in the issue
tried. The effect of permitting an attorney to disclose communications in case'
the client has testified is to impose a
penalty upon the witness for testifying.
Congress has given to parties to an
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action the unqualified right to testify,
and no state can place a restriction
upon the free exercise of that privilege
by declaring that parties who avail
themselves of the right shall be liable
to suffer a penalty for so doing. The
law of Ohio, as declared in sect. 315
of the Code, says to every party to an
action, "You may testify, but if you do
The state
you shall pay a forfeit."
can prescribe such a rule for its own
courts, but the federal courts cannot
adopt this rule, because they would
thereby render the Act of Congreas
partially nugatory.
IL The last point decided by the
Supreme Court is one of great interest,
as it concerns a question which has
never before been directly decided in
this country, although as early as 1855
both the Exchequer Chamber and the
Court of Chancery in England had
established the principle here involved.
In Dalby v. India and London Life
Ass. Co., 15 C. B. 365, and in Law v.
London Indisputable Life Policy Co., 1
Kay & Johns. 223, it was held that
where a creditor had insured the life
of his debtor, the policy continued ii
force and the creditor might recover on
it, although the debt had been paid
before the death of the debtor. But
Mr. May, in his work on Insurance,
although expressing himself in favor
of the doctrine that the cessation of interest in the life insured ought not to
avoid a policy which was valid when
made, nevertheless contends that the
English cases are not authority in this
country, because those canes were de.
cided under the peculiar phraseology
of the Act of 14 Geo. III., c. 48. Mr.
May, however, has been led into a mistaken construction of the meaning of
the decisions in England by his desire
to uphold, at all hazards, his favorite
theory as to the nature of the contract
of life insurance. He contends that
life insurance is always a contract

of indemnity, and maintains that in
this country the cases support his view.
But in DGa/by v. India and London Life
Ass. Co., Baron PARKE emphatically
declares that life insurance is not a
contractkof indemnity, and in order to
save his pet theory from the affect of
this blow, Mr. May argues that the
decision of Baron P~itx rests on the
ground that life insurance was not a
contract of indemnity by the common
law of England, and that the Act of 14
Geo. III., c. 48, only required an interest in the life insured at the inception
of the contract, but that, as by the law
of this country the contract is one of
indemnity, and as we have no such
statute as the 14 Geo. 1IL, c. 48, therefore the English cases are not to !o
regarded as authority in the courts
of the United States. But this argument begs the very question in issue,
viz., whether life insurance is a contract
of indemnity. In the principal case
the Stprame Court of the United States
adopt the words of Baron Ptxax and
say that they expres the law of this
country.
The truth is that Mr. May confounds
the question as to the nature of the
contract with the rule against wagers.
A life insurance policy is not at all a
contract of indemnity, but there exists
in England a statute against policies
unsupported by interest in the life insured, and in this country there is a
rule of public policy against such con-.
tracts. In both countries, however,
this prohibition rests on the ground
that policies without interest are mer
wagers.

The rule against wager policies,
whether it exist by statute or as part
of the common law, is purely a rule
of public policy, and is not in any
sense founded on the idea that contracts of life insurance are contracts
of indemnity.
No other view of the subject will
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explain the decisions in the two English
eases and in the principal case, and also
the dicta of VIarious American courts
hereafter referred to. If the contract
be one of indemnity, there can be no
escape from the conclusion that cessation of interest in the life insured would
prevent recovery on the policy, because
in such a case the holder of the policy
would not be damnified by the death.
The same rule would have to be applied
as in cases of fire and marine insurance.
But if the contract of life insurance is
not one of indemnity, the cases are
easily supported. The rule of public
policy is satisfied if there exist at the
inception of the contract an interest in
the life insured, for the contract is then
not a wager. Public policy being-thus
satisfied, the contract is, like every other
contract, to be construed and enforced
according to its provisions and stipulations, and there being no stipulation
against liability in case of cessation of
interest in the life insured, such an
event will not avoid the contract. In
other words, the law stands between
parties who are endeavoring to enter
into an illegal contract, but if the parties
are so situated with reference to the
subject-matter, that the proposed contract is not illegal, upon the consummation of the contract, they become bound
by the legal tie and can only be separated in accordance with their agreement.
The book of Mr. May has not the
authority of a legal classic, either in
the long standing of the book itself, or
the personal weight of its author's
opinion, but as a recent collection and
review of the cases upon an important
branch of law now in process of rapid
development, its conclusions will be
likely to receive a large amount of consideration from counsel and even from
courts whom the pressure of business
prevents giving the subject the attention its importance requires. For this
VoL. XXV.-51
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reason it is desirable that the conclusions and rules laid down in the book
should be carefully weighed and criticiscd when they appear as in this case
to be the result of a hasty or incomplete
view of the subject, or of an effort even
unconsciously to force the law to conform to a preconceived crotchet as to
what it ought to be.
But although this question has not
before been directly decided in any
American case, there have been a
number of cases where the courts have
utfercd dicta in support of the doctrine
just laid down by the Supreme Court.
In Trenton Ins. Co. v. .Johnson, 4
Zah. 576, it was said that in New
Jersey no interest at all was necessary
to support a policy of life insurance.
This case goes too far, and can be
supported only on the ground that in
that state wager policies are not illegal.
In Mfowry v. Ins. Co., 9 R. I. 346,
and in Raw's v. Ins. Co., 3 Am. Law
Reg. N. S. 167; s. c., 27 N. Y. 282,
the court found that there was in fact
an interest existing at the time of the
death, but in both cases the court said
that the interest need not continue
until the death. In the latter case
Dalby v. Ins. Co. was approved, and in
referring to that case the court said :
"It seems remarkable that any other
view should he taken of this question.
The contract is not to make any loss
good, or to make compensation. The
debt is not insured. It is an absolute
contract to pay, not the amount of a
loss or damage arising from a death,
but a specified sum of money upon the
termination of the life insured."
The Supreme Court of the United
States in Insurance Co. v. Bailey, 13
Wall. 616, laid down the same doctrine
although the point was not necessary
to the decision in that case.
The case of .fcKee v. Ins. Co., 28
Mlo. 383, is the only other case where a
divorce was relied upon as defeating a
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policy on the life of a hushand for the
benefit of the wife, hut that case presented different features, because there
had been issue of the mnrriage, and the
minor children remained with the
mother. The court found, therefore,
that an insurable interest in the life of
the former husband still existed, bechuso
there was a reasonable expectation that
the father would assist in the support
and education of the children.
There are two other cases in which
'the doctrine of the principal case must
have been taken for granted. They
are St. John v. Ins. Co., 13 N. Y. 31,
and Valton v. Assurance ,ociety, 20 N.
Y. 32, in both of which cases, it was
held that the assignee of a policy, Talid
when issued, may recover without proof
of interest in the life insured and without
regard to the amount of consideration
paid for the assignment. See also
McKenty v. Ins. Co., 4 Bigelow's Cases
153; Campbell v. Ins. Co., 98 Mass.
381; Provident Life Ins. Co. v. Baum,
29 Ind. 236.
The most difficult question which
arises on the consideration of this subject is one which was not solved by
the court in this case. It is the question
as to what sort of interest is necessary
to sustain a life policy. The court
said: "It may be said generally that
any reasonable expectation of pecuniary
benefit or advantage from the continued
life of another creates an insurable
interest in such life." This passage
would seem to impose the limitation
that the interest must be pecuniary, but
the court could hardly have intended to
do this, for in the next paragraph of the
decision the court quote with approval
the words of Chief Justice StAw in
Loomis v. Eagle Life Ins. Co., 6 Gray
399, who spoke of " considerations of
strong morals and the force of natural
affection between near kindred," as
affording a sufficient interest.
In lusurance Co. v. Bailey, 13 Wall.

616, the Supreme Court of the United
States also spoke of the relations of
"consanguinity or of affinity," and of
"dependence"
and "natural affection," as constituting an insurable
interest.
The nature and quantum of interest
necessary to support a policy of litb
insurance are things which can hardly
be said to he very definitely fixed. It
has been held that a sister has an interest in the life of a brother who supported her (Lordv. Dall,12 Mass. 115) ;
and even where he did not support her,
but was unmarried, and she was one of
the next of kin (.tlans.
Co. v. Fance,
S. C. U. S., Oct. T. 1876, not reported);
a father in the life of a minor son
(Mitchell v. Union Lfe Ins. Co., 45 Me.
104; Looms v. Eagle Ins. Co., 6 Gfty
396) ; a woman in the life of a man
with whom she had lived, believing
herself to be his wife, although she was
in fact married to another man, whom
she supposed to be dead (Equitable Lfe
Ass. Soc. v. Patterson,41 Ga. 338). in
all these cases there was an expectation
of pecuniary advantage from the continuance in life of the insured, but in
several of the cases, as well as in others
already cited, the courts use language
tending to show that if necessary, they
would regard the mere relationship as
sufficient to support the policy.
The catalogue of insurable interests
has undoubtedly been gradually increasing, but still it cannot be said that
there has been established any definite
general principle, which might serve as
a guide in determining any given case
which may arise.
Perhaps the most definite rule which
could be adopted would be to hold that
a life policy is not a wager whenever
the person effecting the insurance and
the insured stand in such relation to
each other, that the former might reasonably and naturally be expected to
desire the continuance in life of the
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latter, and to make it a question for the as to obviate the objections to a mere wagcr
jury in each case, whether the contract ulon the dances of life."
is a mere betting upon the chances of
As, however, it is the habit of most
lire.
courts, not to lay down general prinThe language used by Judge HoAR ciples, but to decide merely that such
in Forbes v. Insurance Co., 15 Gray 249, an interest as exists in the particular
254, points to this solution of the diffi- case before them, is or is not an insurculty. He said : "As the premium is able interest, any such general rule as
intended to be a precise equivalent to has been stated above, will only be
the risk taken, it would seem that the arrived at after nearly every conceivable
contract is a just and equitable one, sort of interest has been ranged in one
whether any interest in the life exists class or the other, by the process of
or not; and that the only essential inquiry judicial elimination.
is whether the object of the contract is such
J. D. B.
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DANIEL R. BRANT, APPELLANT, v. THE VIRGINIA COAL AND IRON
COMPANY AND JANE SINCLAIR.
Where a testator made a bequest to his wife of all his estate, real and personal
"to have and to hold during her life, and to do with as she sees proper before
her death," -it was held that the wife took a life estate in the property, with only
such power as a life-tenant can have, and that her conveyance of the real property passed no greater interest.
For the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, there must generally
be some intended deception in the conduct or declarations of the party to be estopped, or such gross negligence on his part as to amount to constructive fraud, by
which another has been misled to his injury.
Where the estoppel relates to the title of real property, it is essential to the
application of the doctrine that the party claiming to have been influenced by the
conduct or declarations of another was himself not only destitute of knowledge of
the true state of the title, but also of any convenient and available means of
acquiring such knowledge. Where the condition of the title is known to both parties, or both have the same means of ascertaining the truth, there is no estoppel.
APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the
District of West Virginia.

In April 1831, Robert Sinclair, of Hampshire county, Virginia,
died leaving a widow and eight surviving children. He was at the
time of his death, possessed of some personal property, and the real
property in controversy, consisting of one hundred and ten acres.
By his last will and testament he made the following devise: "I
give and bequeath to my beloved wife, Nancy Sinclair, all my
estate, both real and personal, that is to say, all my lands, cattle,
horses, 'sheep, farming utensils, household and kitchen furniture,
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with everything that I possess, to have and to hold during her life,
and to do with as she sees proper before her death." The will
was duly probated in the proper county.
In July 1839, the widow, for the consideration of eleven hundred
dollars, executed 'adeed to the Union Potomac Company, a corporation created under the laws of Virginia, of the real property thus
devised to her, describing it as the tract or parcel of land on which
she then resided, and the same which was conveyed to her "by the
last will and testament of her late husband." As security for the
payment of the consideration she took at the time from the company
its bond and a mortgage upon the property. The mortgage described the property as the tract of land which had on that day been
conveyed by her to the Union Potomac Company.
In 1854 this bond and mortgage were assigned to the complainant, Daniel Brant and Hector Sinclair, the latter a son of the
widow, in consideration of one hundred dollars cash, and the yearly
payment of the like sum during her life. Previous to this time,
Brant and Hector Sinclair had purchased the interest of all the
other heirs except Jane Sinclair, who was at the time an idiot, or
an insane person; and such purchase was recited in the assignment,
as was also the previous conveyance of a life-interest to the company.
In July 1857, these parties instituted suit for the foreclosure of
the mortgage and sale of the property. The bill described the property as a tract of valuable coal land, which the company had purchased of the widow, and prayed for the sale of the estate purchased.
Copies of the deed of the widow and of the mortgage of the company were annexed to the bill. In due course of proceedings a
decree was obtained directing a sale, by commissioners appointed
for that purpose, of the property, describing it as "the land in the
bill and proceedings mentioned," if certain payments were not made
within a designated period. The payments not being made, the
commissioners, in December 1858, sold the mortgaged property to
one Patrick Hammill, who thus succeeded to all the rights of the
Union Potomac Company.
The defendant corporation, the Virginia Coal and Iron Company,
derived its title and interest in the premises, by sundry mesne conveyances from Hammill, and in 1867 went into possession. Since
then it has cut down a large amount of valuable timber, and has
engaged in mining and extracting coal from the land and disposing
of it.
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Brant, having acquired the interest of Hector Sinclair, brought
the present suit to restrain the company from mining and extracting
coal from the land, and to compel an accounting for the timber cut,
and the coal taken and converted to its use.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FIELD, J., (after stating the facts).-The disposition of the case
depends upon the construction given to the devise of Robert Sinclair
to his widow, and the operation of the foreclosure proceedings, as an
estoppel upon the complainant from asserting title to the property.
The complainant contends that the widow took a life-estate in the
property, with only such power as a life-tenant can have, and that
her conveyance therefor carried no greater interest to the Union
Potomac Company. The defendant corporation, on the other hand,
insists that with the life-estate, the widow took full power to dispose
of the property absolutely, and that her conveyance accordingly
passed the fee.
We are of opinion that the position taken by the complainant is
the correct one. The interest conveyed by the devise to the widow
was only a life estate. The language used admits of no other conclusion. And the accompanying words "to do with as she sees
proper before her death," only conferred power to deal with the
property in such manner as she might choose, consistently with that
estate, and perhaps without liability for waste committed. These
words, used in connection with a conveyance of a leasehold estate,
would never be understood as conferring a power to sell the property
so as to pass a greater estate. Whatever power of disposal the
words confer, is limited by the estate with which they are .connected.
In the case of Bradley v. Westcott, 13 Vesey *449, the testator gave all his personal estate to his wife, for her sole use for life,
to be at her full, free and absolute disposal and disposition during
life; and the court held, that as the testator had given in express
terms an interest for life, the ambiguous words afterward thrown in
could not extend that interest to the absolute property. "I must
construe," said the Master of the Rolls, "the subsequent words with
reference to the express interest for life previously given, that she
is to have as full, free and absolute disposition as a tenant for life
can have."
In Smith v. Bell, 6 Peters 68, the testator gave all his personal estate, after certain payments, to his wife, "to and for her
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own use and disposal absolutely," with a provision that the remainder
after her decease should go to his son. The court held that the
latter clause qualified the former, and showed that the wife only
took a life-estate. In construing the language of the devise, Chief
Justice MARSHALL, after observing that the operation of the words
"to and for her own use and benefit and disposal absolutely," annexed to the bequest, standing alone, could not be questioned, said:
"But suppose the testator had added the words ' during her natural
life;' these words would have restrained those which preceded them,
and have limited the use and benefit and the absolute disposal given
by the prior words, to the use and benefit and to a disposal for the
life of the wife. The words, then, are susceptible of such limitation.
It may be imposed on them by other words. Even the words ' disposal absolutely' may have their character qualified, by restraining
words connected with and explaining them, to mean such absolute
disposal as a tenant for life may make."
The Chief Justice then proceeded to show that other equivalent
words might be used, equally manifesting the intent of the testator
to restrain the estate of the wife to her life, and that the words devising a remainder to the son were thus equivalent.
In Boyd v. &.rahan, 86 Ill. 855, there was a bequest to the wife
of all the personal property *ofthe testator, not otherwise disposed
of, "to be at her own disposal and for her own proper use and benefit
during her natural life," and the court held that the words "during
her natural life" so qualified the power of disposal as to make it
mean such disposal as a tenant for life could make.
Numerous other cases to the same purport might be cited. They
all show that where a power of disposal accompanies a bequest or
devise of a life-estate, the power is limited to such disposition as a
tenant for life can make, unless there are other words clearly indicating that a large power was intended.
The position that the complainant is estopped by the proceedings
for -the foreclosure of the mortgage, from asserting title to the property, has less plausibility than the one already considered. There
was nothing in the fact that the complainant and Hector Sinclair
owned seven-eighths of the reversion which prevented them from
taking a mortgage upon the life-estate, or purchasing one already
executed. There was no misrepresentation of the character of the
title which they sought to subject to sale by the foreclosure suit.
The bill of complaint in the suit referred to the deed from the widow
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to the Union Potomac Company, and to mortgage executed to
secure the consideration, and copies were annexed. As already
stated, the deed described the property sold as the tract conveyed
to the widow by the last will and testament of her late husband.
The mortgage described the property as the tract of land conveyed
on the same day to the mortgagor. The decree ordering the sale
described the property as "the lands in the bill and proceedings
mentioned." The purchaser was bound to take notice of the title.
He was directed to its source by the pleadings in the case. The
doctrine of caveat emptor applies to all judicial sales of this character; the purchaser takes only the title which the mortgagor possessed; and here, as a matter of fact, he knew that he was obtaining only a life-estate by his purchase. He so stated at the sale,
and frequently afterward. There is no evidence that either the
complainant or Hector Sinclair ever made any representations to
the defendant corporation to induce it to buy the property from the
purchaser at the sale, or that they made any representations to any
one respecting the title inconsistent with the fact; but, on the contrary, it is abundantly estalished by the evidence in the record, that
from the time they took from the widow the assignment of the bond
and mortgage of the Union Potomac Company, in 1854, they always
claimed to own seven-eighths of the reversion. The assignment
itself recited that the widow had owned and had sold to that company a life-interest in the property, and that they had acquired the
interest of the heirs.
It is difficult to see where the doctrine of equitable estoppel comes
in here. For the application of that doctrine there must generally
be some intended deception in the conduct or declarations of the
party to be estopped, or such gross negligence on his part as to
amount to constructive fraud, by which another has been misled to
his injury. "In all this class of cases," says Story, '"the doctrine
proceeds upon the ground of constructive fraud or of gross negligence,
which in effect implies fraud. And, therefore, when the circumstances of the case repel any such inference, although there may be
some degree of negligence, yet courts of equity will not grant relief.
It has been accordingly laid down by a very learned judge that the
cases on this subject go to this result only, that there must be positive fraud or concealment, or negligence so gross as to amount to
constructive fraud :" 1 Story's Equity 891. To the same purport
is the language of the adjudged cases. Thus it is said by the Su-
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preme Court of Pennsylvania that "the primary ground of the
doctrine is that it would be a fraud in a party to assert what his
previous conduct had denied, when on the faith of that denial others
have acted. The element of fraud isessential either in the intention
of the party est6pped or in the effect of the evidence which he
attempts to set up :" Billv. _7'ppley, 31 Penna. St. 334; Henshaw
v. Bissell, 18 Wall. 271 ; Boggs v. &ferced Mining Company,
14 Cal. 868 ; Davis v.Davis, 26 Id. 28 ; Commonwealth v. Moltz,
10 Barr 531; Copeland v. Copeland, 28 Maine 539 ; Delaplaine
v. Hitchcock, 6 Hill 616 ; Havis v. Marchant, 1 Curtis C. C. 186;
Zuchtmann v. Robert, 109 Mass. 53. And it would seem that to
the enforcement of an estoppel of this character with respect to the
title of property, such as will prevent a party from asserting his
legal rights, and the effect of which will be to transfer the enjoyment
of the property to another, the intention to deceive and mislead, or
negligence so gross as to be culpable, should be clearly establishe&
There are undoubtedly cases where a party may be concluded
from asserting his original rights to property in consequence of his
acts or conduct, in which the presence of fraud, actual or constructive, is wanting; as where one of two innocent parties must suffer
from the negligence of another; he through whose agency the negligence was occasioned will be held to bear the loss; and where one
has received the fruits of a transaction, he is not permitted to deny
its validity whilst retaining its benefits. But such cases are generally referable to other principles than that of equitable estoppel,
although the same result is produced; thus the first case here mentioned is the .affixing of liability upon the party who from negligence indirectly occasioned the injury, and the second is the application of the doctrine of ratification or election. Be this as it may,
the general ground of the application of the principle of equitable
estoppel is as we have stated.
It is also essential for its application with respect to the title of
real property that the party claiming to have been influenced by
the conduct or declarations of another to his injury, was himself
not only destitute of knowledge of the true state of the title, but
also of any convenient and available means of acquiring such knowledge. Where the condition of the title is known to both parties,
or both have the same means of ascertaining the truth, there can
be no estoppel: Crest v. Jack, 3 Watts 240; Knouff v. Thompson,
4 Harris 361.
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Tested by these views, the defence of estoppel set up in this case
entirely fails.
The decree of the Circuit Court must be reversed, and the cause
remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
The foregoing case rests upon two as announced by the unanimous voice
questions. As to the first, that, namely, of the authorities, that in order to
as to the effect of the words in the will estop, the declaration or conduct relied
in determining the estate held, we shall upon as estoppel must have produced
say nothing, remembering the ever- action on the part of the person who
varying character of the authorities seeks to take advantage of the estoppel.
upon such points and the fact that COuLTER, J., well expressed the law
every case of the interpretation of a on the subject in Patterson v. Lytle, I
will rests peculiarly upon its own foun- Jones (Pa.) 53 (1849) ; "The princidation ; in no species of case can we ple, I apprehend, runs through the
cite authorities with so little confidence, whole doctrine of estoppel that a man
beyond those bearing upon a few gen- is only prevented from alleging the
eral principles. In the language of the truth when his assertion of a falsehood
court in 3 Wilson 141, "Cases on wills or his silence has been the inducement
may guide us to general rules of con- to 'action by the other party, which
struction, but unless a case cited be in would result in loss if the opponent was
every respect directly in point and permitted to gainsay what he had before
agree in every circumstance, it will asserted or induced the other to believe
have little or no weight with the court, by his acts." In Meister v. Birney, 24
which always looks upon the intention Mich. 435 (1872), COOLEY, J., said :
9f the testator as the polar star to direct "But there can be no estoppel unless
them in the construction of wills."
the plaintiff was induced to take some
Upon the matter involved in the action in reliance upon the statement,
second head of the opinion-equitable which he was not legally bound to take,
estoppel-it may, however, be of some which otherwise he would not have
service to present some of the cases taken and which will result to his detribearing upon some of the points.
ment if the statement upon which he
The doctrine of equitable estoppel, as relied is allowed to be disproved." See
it is called, though we prefer the name also Otis v. Sel, 8 Barb. 102 (1849) ;
estoppel by conduct, as more expressive Ridred v. Hazlitt's Adm'r, 9 Casey 307
of the true nature of the .thing, is
(la58).
As to the amount of. action which
of comparatively recent growth; for a
long time the old maxim, "estoppels
the party seeking to enforce the estoppel
are odious," resisted all assaults upon must have taken, in Jfeister v. Birney,
its authority and was only undermined supra, the fact that the party had made
by slow degrees. It is not our intention expenditures in litigation was considto narrate its history or to examine the ered a sufficient support for an estoppel.
doctrine fully, but merely to look at a In Brookcman v. ,letcalf, 4 Rob. 568
few of its salient points, as exhibited by
(1867), the plaintiff brought an action
decided cases.
on a promissory note, and the Statute
I. As to what action induced by con- of Limitations was pleaded. The eviduct will suffice to estop.
dence showed that the plaintiff had preIt may, in the first place, be assumed, viously brought an action against the
VOL. XXV.-52
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same defendant on another note, given
under similar circumstances with the
one then in suit, that lie had 3 before the
bar of the statute intervened, met the
defendant and told him that he intended
to sue out the seconil note ; whercupon
the defendant said that if the plaintiff
would forbear suing he would let the
second note abide the result of the
action on the first. The plaintiff thereupon countermanded an order which lie
had given to his attorney to bring
action, hut the defendant afterwards
refused to abide the result of the first
case. The court held the defendant
estopped from setting up the statute.
This case, however, was overruled by
,iiapley v. Abbott, 42 N. Y. 443 (1870),
which also arose with reference to the
Statute of Limitations, the plaintiff
having been induced to defer bringing
action by a representation by the defendant that he would not plead the statute.
In Knights v. Whiffin, Law Rep. 5
Q. B. 660 (1870), W., a merchant, sold
80 qrs. of barley to M., hut did not
separate them from the bulk of his grain
in store. W. sold 60 qrs. to K. who
paid for them and received from M. a
delivery order, addressed to the station
master of the railroad, who was posted
at the town where the warehouse was
situated. The station master took the
order to W., who-said, " All right, when
you get the forwarding note I will put
the barley on the line." Three sacks
were weighed out, but the plaintiff,
resting on W.'s assurance, gave no forwarding order until after M. had become
bankrupt.
W., then, as an unpaid
vendor, refused to part with the grain.
At the trial a verdict was directed for
the defendant with leave to the plaintiff
to move for judgment for the amount
claimed. The court in banc gave judgment for the plaintiff; BLACKBURN,
N
doubt the law is
J., remarking : 1
that until an appropriation from bulk is
made so that the vendor has said what
portion belongs to him and what to the

buyer, the goods remain in soltdo and
no property passes. But can Whiffin
here be permitted to say 'I never set
aside any quarters?' * * * In the
present case the money was paid before
the presentation of the delivery order,
but I think, nevertheless, that the position of the plaintiff was altered through
the defendant's conduct. The defendant
knew that when he assented to the delivery order, the pliaintiff, as a reasonable
man, would rest satisfied. If the plaintiff had been met by a refusal on the
part of the defendant he could have
gone to Mars and have demanded back
his money; very likely he might not
have derived much benefit if lie had
done so, but he had a right to do it.
The plaintiff did rest satisfied in tjse
belief, as a reasonable man, that the
property had been passed to him. * * *
The plaintiff may well say ' I abstained
from active measures in consequence
of your statement and I am entitled to
hold you precluded from denying what
you stated was true.' "1
These cases certainly seem literal
enough in the enforcement of the doctrine of estoppel ; on the other hand, in
&imson v. Farnham, Law Rep. 7 Q. B.
175 (1871), it was denied that the
mere alteration of position involved in
bringing an action was a sufficient
ground for an estoppel, and in East et
ux. v. Doolittle, 72 N. C. 562 (1874), it
was said by RODMAN, J.: "The damage
to support an estoppel against the owner
of an estate and to convert him into a
trustee must be something more substantial than would amount to a consideration in a contract. It must be a
substantial one and of such a character
that the person sustaining it cannot be
adequately compensated by pecuniary
damages."
II. Will admissions to a third party
estop?
The current of authority is that an
admission or declaration made to a third
party cannot be made use of as estoppel.
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In Hcarne v. Rogers, 3 B. & C. 577
(1829), an alleged bankrupt had assisted his assignees in the sale of his
goods, and after the issue of the commission against him, had given notice
to the lessors of a farm held by him,
that he had become bankrupt and would
surrender the farm. The action being
brought by him to test the validity of
the commission.
The above actions
were held not to estop him from showing
that he was not in reality a bankrupt,
as they were admissions to a third party
as between himself and the assignees.
In PriceY. Andrews, 6 Cush. 4 (1856),
an action against a deputy sheriff for
seizing the property of the plaintiff under
an execution against another, the plaintiff was held not estopped by declarations
made to the agent of the execution plaintiff, who did not disclose his agency,
that the property levied on was that of
the execution debtor; METCALF, J.,
remarking: "Certainly no one can be
estopped by a deceptive answer to a
question, which he may rightly deem
impertinent and propounded by a meddlesome intruder."
It has, however, been held that declarations to third parties coming to the
ears of another who acts upon the information may estop. In 3fitchell v. Reed,
9 Cal. 204 (1858), the plaintiff, a sot
of temperance, kept a grocery store, at
which were sold liquors ; the store was
generally conducted by a clerk. On
the trial it was proved that the plaintiff
had repeatedly denied that he sold
liquors, saying that those in the sto.e
belonged to the clerk ; this coming to
the ears of a Creditor of the latter, he
attached and sold the liquor as his.
The plaintiff was held estopped from
proving that the liquors were his.
BURNETT, J., took very broad ground
in his opinion. "If parties choose to
make untrue statements by which others
are injured, they should be estopped
to unsay what they have before said.
Estoppels in general are odious, but in

mercantile and ordinary business transactions, where men must trust to appearances and the declarations of parties
because they have no other means of
information, in such cases the courts
have been inclined to extend the list
of estoppels." It may, perhaps, be
questioned whether this case does not
go a little too far, and whether to sustain it as a decision, there should not
have been some evidence that the debt
had been permitted to be contracted on
the faith of the allegation that the liquor
belonged to the clerk, the equivalent of
which was implied in the decision of
Gailinghouse v. Whitwell, 31 Barb. 208
(1868). This however doesnot affect it
as an opinion on the point immediately
under consideration.
III. 77ie tffect of silence.
Silence will often have the same effect
as an action where it is the duty of the
person to speak; as said by AGNEW, J.,
in Chapman v. Chapman, 9 P. F. Smith
214 (1868): "Silence will postpone
a title when one should speak out, when
knowing his own right one suffers
his silence to lull to rest instead of
warning of danger, when to use the
language of the books, silence becomes
a fraud. Such a silence, though negative in form, is operative in effect, and
becomes suggestive in the seeming
security it leads to." See also Stephens.
v. Baird, 9 Cow. 274 (1828).
IV. Whether to sustain an estoppel by
conduct, there- mst be an intention to deceive, or whether such action as might be
suppo.'el to mislead an ordinarily careful
man will be sufficient e'en without any deceifful intent or its equivalent, gross negligence, on the part of the person sought to
be estopped.
This question has perhaps been the
subject of greater difference amongst
the authorities than any other arising
out of the entire doctrine of estoppel by
conduct. Pickard v. Sears, 6 Ad. &
Ell. 469, is generally considered the
leading case upon this branch of the
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subject, though there are one or two
American cases on the same question,
which antedate it; yet on account of
its frequent citation and because a certain phrase in Lord )ENMAN'S opinion
has led to considerable discussion, not
to say confusion, we may well take it
as a starting point.
T'e facts of Pickard v. Sears were
briefly as follows : A fi. fa. was issued
against one Metcalfe, and certain machinery in his possession, but on which
the plaintiff held a mortgage with a
covenant that he might enter upon the
defendant~s premises and take possession of the machinery, was levied on
and sold to the defendants. No notice
of the mortgage was given to the sheriff
until after the sale. After the levy and
before the sale the execution creditor's
attorney had several conversations with
the plaintiff, sometimes in Metealfe's
presence, with regard to the seizure, in
the course of which the plaintiff never
made any claim, though he stated that
Metealfe was his debtor, but consulted
the attorney as to the best way of disposing of the machinery; after certain
negotiations for a sale had failed, the
attorney advised the plaintiff to raise a
sum of money and-pay off the judgment,
anl the plaintiff referred the attorney
to a person from whom it was unsuc.cessfully attempted to obtain the money;
before the sale the attorney told the
plaintiff that the defendants were about
to purchase. There was no doubt that
the mortgage was a bong, fide one and
that the defendants purchased without
notice of it. The plaintiff was held
estopped. Lord DENMAN said: "But
the rule of law is clear that where one
by his words or conduct Wilfully causes
another to believe the existence of a
certain state of things and induces him
to act on that belief, so as. to alter his
own previous position, the former is
concluded from averring against the
latter a different state of things as existing at the same time."

The word "wilfully" has been the
source of considerable trouble to some
courts professing to follow the rule here
laid down, some giving to the word the
force of" voluntary," others making it
almost equivalent to "with malice
aforethought."
Starting from Pickard v. Sears, the
cases may he divided into three classes :
1. Those which hold that any course
of action or declaration calculated to
lead, and which does lead to action on
the part of the person relying thereon,
is sufficient to estop without reference to
intention.
2. Those which hold that the course
of hction must have been pursued, or
the declaration made, with intention to
influence the person acting thereon,
although there need not be any intert
to deceive.
3. Those which hold that there must
be either an intent to deceive, or gross
negligence from which fraud may be
inferred.
We are of course aware that there are
several cases which seem to be very
close upon the line of division, and to
be referable to one o' the other rather
upon the opinion of the court than the
facts of the case; but still we think
that the above division can be clearly
ecognised as running through the authorities.
1. Amongst the cases of the first class
we find Gregq v. Wells, 10 Ad. & E.
90 (1839), in which Lord DEN xx
said: " Pickard v. Sears was in my
mind at the time of the trial and the
principle may be stated even more
broadly than it is there laid down, A
party, who negligently or culpably
stands by and allows another to contract on the faith and understanding of
a fact, which he can contradict, cannot
afterwards dispute that fact in the
action against the person, whom he
has himself assisted in deceiving."
Cornish v. Abingdon, 4 H. & N. 549
(1859).
In this case one G. the fore-
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man of C., a map engraver, desiring to
publish some maps on his own account,
agreed with A., who was a publisher,
to supply him with maps, &c., and entered an order as from A. in C.'s book.
Goods were supplied to A. from C.'s
premises, accompanied in some instances by a delivery order as follows :
1Mr. A. please receive, &c., from W.
C." Receipts to the same effect were
signed by A. C. made out an account
charging A. and handed it to G., who
showed it to A., who accepted bills for
a portion of it and paid part in cash,
which G. delivered to C. Other goods
being supplied, C. sent A. an invoice
thereof, charging him. A. applied to
G., who said it was a mistake, but did
not inform the plaintiff. The jury
found that A. did not authorize G. to
use his name, but that he had acted in
such a way as to lead C. to believe
that he was selling to him. Judgment
was entered for the plaintiff, the court
holding A. estopped. POLLOCK, C. B.
said : "If any person by a course of
conduct or by actual expressions so
conducts himself that another may reasonably infer the existence of an agreement or license, whether the party intends that he should do so or not, it has
the effect that the party using that language or who has so conducted himself
cannot afterwards gainsay the reasonable
inference to be drawn from his words or
conduct." BRAMWELL, B.-" The rule
is that if a man so conducts himself,
whether intentionally or not, that a
reasonable person would infer that a
certain state of affairs exists and acts
on that inference he shall be afterwards
estopped from denying it."
Woodleit v. Coventry, 2 7H. & C. 164
(1863) ; in this case one Clarke applied
to the plaintiff for an advance on some
flour which he had purchased of the
defendant, and gave the plaintiff an
order on the defendant for the flour;
before making the advance the plaintiff
sent to the defendant's warehouse to

ask if the flour "were all in order,"
and received as an answer, "Yes."
The messenger took samples of the
flour and the plaintiff made the advance. Clarke became a bankrupt and
absconded without paying for the flour,
which had not been specifically appropriated. The defendant claimed to hold
as an unpaid vendor. There was a verdict for the plaintiff, and a rule for anew
trial was discharged, the court holding
the defendant estopped by his answer to
the plaintiff's inquiry. See also Knight
v. lViffin, supra.
In the United States, one of the earliest cases of this class is Buchanan v.
Moore, 13 S. & R. 304 (1825). Certain
lands of Buchanan were levied on. At
the sale, in the presence of Moore and
others, Buchanan alleged that a certain
piece of ground was included in the
levy. Under that impression Moore
bought, and afterwards brought ejectment for the said piece : on the trial the
defence was that it had not in fact been
included in the levy, and hence was not
sold under it. In the Common Pleas
the judge charged : 1"If the levy in its
terms were such as might reasonably
include it (the land in dispute), and it
was represented at and before the sale
to be included by General Buchanan,
and on the faith of such representations
John Moore became the purchaser,
Buchanan, under such circumstances,
would be bound by his representations
and not otherwise. * * Although the
levy was not intended to include the
land in dispute, if, in its terms it might
fairly be construed to include it, and
both Moore and Buchanan believed it
was included and it was so represented
by Buchanan, before and at the sale,
then by purchase the right to the whole
vested in the purchaser and under his
deed he was entitled to the possession."
There was judgment for the plaintiff
which was affirmed by the Supreme
Court, GuBsoN, J. saying " If by reason of the defendant's declarations at
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the sale the plaintiff was induced to
purchase-under a belief that it was included, although the sheriff's deed would
not convey the legal title, yet his purchase would give him an equity, which
chancery would redder effectual by decreeing a conveyance, and this whether
such declaration proceeded from design
or misapprehension of the fact. If both
are equally innocent a loss in consequence of the acts or declarations of the
one ought not to be borne by the other."
In The Manqfarturers' and Traders'
Bank v. Hazard, 30 N. Y. 226 (1864),
it was said in the opinion of the court
by T. A. Jontsox, J., "It is not necessary to an equitable estoppel that
the party should design to mislead.
If his act was calculated to mislead and
actually has misled another acting in
good faith and exercising reasonable
care and diligence under all the circumstances, that is enough."
See also Chapman v. Chapmau, supra,
where AoNEtw, J., said : "Positive
acts tending to mislead one ignorant of
the truth and which do mislead him are
a good ground ofestoppel, and ignorance
of title on the part of him who is
estopped will.not excuse his act ;" and
Storrs v. Baker, 6 Johns. Ch. 166
(1822) ; -l'nneganv. Carraher, 47 N.
Y. 493 (1872), and Commonwealth v.
Mdltz, IGBarr530.
2. Of the second class we have Freeman eta!. v. Cooke, 2 Ex. 654 (1848).
The plaintiffs were assignees in bankruptcy of W. Broadhead, the defendant
was a deputy-sheriff. A fi. fa. had
been issued against J. and B. Broadhead, and given to the defendant to
serve ; the bankrupt anticipating i distress for rent had removed his goods to
the house of one of his brothers. When
the officer came to levy, the bankrupt,
imagining that he had a distress, said
that the goods belonged to B. Broadhead,
and after the production of the writ that
they belonged to another brother, and
finally that they were his own. The

deputy seized the goods and the assignees
brought an action. On this state of
facts it was held that the plaintiffs were
not estopped to prove property. PAmcLE.
B., said (after quotingLord )ENMAN'S
enunciation of the rule, ut supra) : "By
the term ' wilfully,' however, in that
rule we must understand, if not that the
party represents that to be true which
he knows to be untrue, at least that he
means his representation to be acted
upon accordingly, and if, whatever a
man's real intention may be, he so conducts himself that a reasonable man
would take the representation to be true
and believe that it was meant that he
should act upon it and did act upon it
as true, the party making the representation would he equally precluded from
contesting its truth, and conduct by
negligence or omission, whenever there
is a duty east upon a person by usage
of trade or otherwise, to disclose the
truth, may often have the same effect.
* * * But *

t*

the finding of the

jury is insufficient to entitle the defendant to have a verdict. * * *
It is not found that he intended to
induce the officer to seize the goods
as those of Benjamin, and whatever intention he had on his first statement
was done away with by an opposite
statement before the seizure took place.
Nor can it be said that any reasonable
man would have seized the goods on
the faith of the bankrupt's representaThis last
tion taken all together."
sentence seems to give a double aspect
to the case-still it will be observed
that the opinion contains an express
modification of Lord DEx01AN'S doctrine. In ,ardon v. Money, 5 H. L.
185 (1854) the opinion of the same
eminent judge was considered by Lord
CnANWOaTH, w.yho thought it stated the
doctrine a little too broadly and agreed
with Baron PARxE's statement. In
this case it was also decided that the
rule of equitable estoppel was applicable to misrepresentation of fact only
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and not of intention ; from this decision, one will be cstopped by a representation
however, enforced by Lords CRAN- made which turns out not to be true,
and BROUGHAm, Lord ST. where there was no intention to influWORT
LEONARns dissented in a very strong ence the conduct of any one by it and
where it was not apparent that the
opinion.
In Welland Canal Co. v. Ilathaway, representation would have that effect.
8 Wenl. 480 (1832), NELSON, ,L.,
thus I take the doctrine established by the
stated the doctrine : "As a general rule decided weight of authority, that there
a person will be concluded from denying must be such intention or that it must
be so apparent that the representation
his own acts or admissions, which were
expressly designed to influence the con- will have that effect that the intention
duct of another and (lid so influence it, must be presumed." See also Dezell v.
and when such denial will operate to Oell, 3 Hill 215 (1842) ; Plhanmer v.
Lord, 9 Allen 4.55 (1864) ; Turner v.
the injury of the latter."
In Oths v. Sell, 8 Barb. 102, PAxOE, Coffin, 12 Id. 401 (1866).
3. Of the third class, Andrews v.
P. J., said : "1The act must have been
expressly designed to influence the con- Lyons, II Allen 349 (1865), is a good
duct of another and must in fact have example. A note was given by the
influenced it." The necessity of in- defendant to the firm of C. & W. in
tention was also" held in Wilcox v. payment for liquors sold in violation
Howell, 44 N. Y. 398 (1871).
In of law; the note was offered for sale to
the plaintiff, who first went to the deBrown v. Bowen, 30 Id. 541 (1861),
that the party had reason to believe fendant and inquired with reference to
his declaration or action would influ- the note ; the defendant said : " Yes it
ence the other was regarded as equiva- is all right, I shall pay it soon." The
plaintiff then bought the note. AssEs,
lent to actual intention so to influence.
The point was very learnedly con- J., charged that if the plaintiff, before
sidered in New Jersey in the case of purchasing the note, received from the
Kuhl v. .Jersey City, 8 C. E. Green 84 defendant what could be reasonably and
(1872).
Kuhl bought property in Jer- fairly understood as an assurance that
sey City from one N., having procured it was a lawful and binding one, the
a certificate from the collector of the defendant would be estopped from setamount of taxes due. On the delivery ting up the illegal consideration as
of the deed N. went to the collector, against the plaintiff. This th Supreme
gave him his cheek for the amount and Judicial Court reversed, holding that
received receipts as follows : " Received there must be shown intentional deceppayment. Jas. H. Love, collector."
tion.
On the faith of the receipt Kuhl paid
In Boggs v. Mferced Mining Co., 14
the purchase-money for the property.
Cal. 368 (1858), Mr. Justice FIELD
The check was not paid, ant the col- held the same doctrine announced by
lector advertised the property for sale him in the principal case, and laid down
for the arrears of taxes. The plaintiff as one of the conditions of estoppel
then filed a bill to restrain tile sale. that the party sought to be estopped
There was nothing to show that Love must have "made the admission with
knew the use to be made of his receipts.
the express intention to deceive or with
Z.snttsittE, Ch., in dismissing the bill such carelessness and culpable neglisaid: "There is a seeming conflict
gence as to amount to constructive
among the numerous decisions on the fraud ;" and in llenshaw v. Bissell,
doctrine of r'stoppl in iis, sometimes 18 Wall. 271 (1873), the same judge
called equitable estoppel, whether any said : "There must be some intended
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deception in the conduct or declaration
of the party to be estopped, or such
gross negligence on his part as to
amount to constructive fraud."
See
also Danforth v. Adams, 29 Conn. 107
(1860).
It has, however, been held
that the intention to deceive may be a
general one and have no especial reference to the particular person who seeks
to enforce the estoppel.
In Horn v. Cole, 51 N. H. 287 (1868),
the plaintiff packed certain goods, direeted- them to his son, C. E. Horn,
and delivered them to. a freight agent.
Cole, a creditor of the son, attached
the box and its contents, and the plaintiff brought trover. There was no evidence that when Horn carried the goods
to the station, he told Cole the goods
belonged to the son. There was no
evidence that the plaintiff intended to
deceive the defendant especially, but.
rather that his intention was to deceive
his own creditors. He was held estopped, and PERLEY, C. J., said : " The
evidence reported in this ease was competent to prove ** * that Cole believed
the representations to be true, and relying on them as true, caused the goods
to be attached as the property of C. E.
Horn, and also that the plaintiff made
these representations, knowing them to
be false, with the intention that all persons who were interested in the subject
should take them to be true
* * to
deceive his own creditors. * * * But
we cannot infer that the plaintiff had
Cole in his mind as an individual whom
he meant to deceive. * * * This raises
the point * * * whether to estop a party
from showing that representations were
false it is necessary that the false representations should have been intended to
deceive and defraud the individual party
who trusted to them and acted on them
provided there was a general intention
to deceive and defraud all persons who
vere interested'in the subject-matter of
the false representations. * * * We are
content to follow where the spirit and gen-

eral tone of those decisions lead, and they
lead plainly to the conclusion that where
a man makes a statement disclaiming his
title to property in a manner and under
circumstances such as he must understand, those who heard the statement
would believe to be true, and if they had
an interest in the subject would act on
as true, and one using his own means
of knowlege with due diligence, acts on
the statement as true, the party who
makes the statement cannot show that
his representation was false to the injury of the party who believed it to be
true and acted on it as such; that he
will be liable for the natural consequences of his representation, and cannot be heard to say that the party actually injured was the one he meant to
deceive, or that his fraud did not take
effect in the manner he intended."
V. The effect of a record.
It may be noticed further as a point
arising in the principal case that a
person will not be estopped, by his
silence at least, where there is recordevidence to which the other party might
have resorted for information. This
proceeds from the familiar principle
that where there is equal knowledge or
means of knowledge, there can he no
estoppel, because in the view of the law
no injury can be done to a man by telling him that which he knows, or, by
the exercise of reasonable diligence, can
readily know, to be untrue ; as said by
STRONG, J., in Hill v. Eppley, 7 Casey
331 (1858).
"If, therefore, the truth
he known to both parties or if they have
equal means of knowledge there can be
no estoppel."
In Knauff v. Tompson, 4 Harris 357
(1851), the point of the effect of a record
was directly ruled as preventing an
estoppel, the court, in its opinion, however, intimated that the effect of action
might be different from that of mere
silence, and that while the latter would
not estop in the face of a deed on record
the former might.
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The same was helt] in Crest v. .Tck,
3 Watts 240, by SFRGEA.T. J. "Nor
was the plaintiff hound to notify Blair
of his right in the land or of his dissent
to the erection of tle buildings. Blair

was well acquainted with the titles * **
and if he was not he was bound to inquire. * * * It was matter of record
accessible to all."
H. Bunv, JR.
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lI. T. ARNOLD.

Section 639, of the Revised Statutes of the United States, relating to the removal
of causes from state to federal courts, is not entirely repealed by the Act of March
3d 1875.
The third subdivision of section 639, relating to suits between citizens of the
states in which they trc brought, and citizens of other states, not being inconsistent
with the Act of 1875, is not repealed by it.
The result of the provisions of the third subdivision of section 639, and the Act
of 1875, taken together, is, First that no citizen of a state in which a suit is brought
can remove it, except on petition filed before or at the term at which it might first
bdrtried. Second, that where a suit is between citizens of different states, neither
of whom is a citizen of the state in which the suit is brought, neither party can
remove it except on petition filed before or at the term at which it might first be
tried. Third, but when the suit is between a citizen of the state in which it is
brought and a citizen of another state, the latter may remove it by petition filed,
at any time before trial or final hearing upon making an affidavit of prejudice or
local influence which will prevent his obtaining a fair trial.
The repeal of statutes by implication is not favored, and will not be held unless
the two are incapable of being reconciled.
MOTION to remand the case to the state court.
The action was brought in the Warren Circuit Court of Kentucky,
on the 7th of January 1874. It was subsequently transferred to the
Warren Court of Common Pleas. The defendant, Ford, making no
defence, judgment was rendered against him by default, according

to the practice prevailing in the state.

The defendant, Arnold, filed

his answer, which tendered an issue of fact triable by jury.

After

the time at which the cause could have been first tried, and, in fact,
after at least one mistrial, subsequent to the passage of the Act
of Congress of 1875, Arnold filed his petition in said court for the
removal of the suit into this court. At the time he filed this petition 1e made and filed in the state court, an affidavit stating that
he had reason to believe, and did believe, that, from prejudice or
local influence, lie would not be able to obtain justice in the state
court. The prayer of the petition was granted.
A copy of the record having been filed in this court, the plaintiff,
VOL. XXV.-53
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Cooke, entered his appearance, and moved that the cause be remanded to the state court.
BALLARD, J.-The sole ground of the motion is that the petition
for removal was filed in the state court too late.
The counsel of plaintiff, with a frankness characteristic of those
counsel only who perceive with clearness the true question involved
in a case, concedes that the defendant's application for a removal is
literally covered by the provisions of the third subdivision of
section 689 of the Revised Statutes; and he stakes his case on the
position that these provisions are repealed by the Act of March 3d
1875: Statutes at Large, vol. 18, p. 470.
The question thus presented for a decision is a narrow one, but
it is by no means free from difficulty. Neither the researches of
counsel nor my own examination has developed any case which
decides or even throws much light on the question. The only authority to which I have been referred bearing on the precise quqstion at issue, is the late pamphlet by Judge DILLON, on the
"Removal of Causes from State to Federal Courts." The learned
author, after indicating, doubtfully, his own opinion that the part
of subdivision three which refers to the time of removal is not
repealed by the Act of 1875, says: "This has been decided to be
so in the Eighth Circuit by Mr. Justice MILLER, and generally in
the courts of that circuit, and, so far as we are advised, by the
Circuit Courts elsewhere."
I should be disposed to follow, without question, a single decision
of so eminent a judge as Mr. Justice MILLER if such decision were
supported by a written opinion, and I should certainly not hesitate
to follow the settled rule of decision in the several circuits ; but the
bare statement that Judge MILLER has decided the question on the
circuit, that his decision has been followed in his circuit, and, as
far as known, in other circuits, though made by so accurate an author as the able judge of the Eighth Circuit, cannot dispense with
the necessity of an independent examination of the question. Counsel have therefore discussed the question before me as an open one,
and as such I propose to consider it. In prosecuting this examination I shall not refer to the acts of Congress relating to the removal
of causes which were passed prior to the Revised Statutes. As the
Revised Statutes repealed all such prior acts, reference to them
would, I think, tend only to embarrass the inquiry. Indeed, the
proposition discussed by counsel renders such reference superero-
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gatory. The defendant's counsel rests his right to the removal on
the ground that the third subdivision of section 639 of Revised Statutes is still in force; and the plaintiff's counsel rests his motion to
remand on the ground that it is repealed.
Plaintiff's counsel does not, of course, insist that it is in terms
repealed, but he maintains that its provisions are inconsistent with
those of the Act of 1875, and hence that it is repealed by the express
provision of that act, which declares that "all acts and parts of acts
in conflict with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed."
I shall, for a like reason, confine my attention to the provisions
of the statutes which relate to the removal "of controversies between
citizens of different states," and shall omit all reference to the provisions contained in them which prescribe the amount necessary to
give the court jurisdiction.
Omitting, then, all except what is necessary to elucidate the
question before us, let us bring the provisions of the Revised Statutes and of the Act of 1875 together, and we shall then be the better
able to see whether the latter are in conflict with the former.
Section 639 of the Revised Statutes provides that "any suit
commenced in a state court * * * may be removed for trial into
the Circuit Court. * * 4'
"First-When the suit is *** by a citizen of the state wherein
it is brought, and against a citizen of another state. * * *
"Second-When the suit is by a citizen of the state wherein it is
brought against a citizen of the same and a citizen of another state.
"Third-When the suit is between a citizen of the state in which
it is brought and a citizen of another state."
The Act of 1875 authorizes the removal of any suit of a civil
nature * * * now pending, or hereafter brought in a state court
in which there shall be a controversy between citizens of different
%
states.
In the first case the suit may be removed on the petition of the
defendant only, filed in the state court at the time of entering his
appearance in said court.
In the second case the suit, as against the citizen of another state,
may be removed on his petition filed at any time before trial or final
hearing.
In the third case the suit may be removed by the citizen of the
state other than that in which the suit is brought, whether he be
plaintiff or defendant, on his petition filed at any time before trial
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or final hearing of the suit, if before, or at the time he files his
petition he makes and files in the state court an affidavit stating
that he has reason to believe, and does believe, that from prejudice
or local influence he will not be able to obtain a fair trial in the
state court.
In the last case (Act of 1875) the suit may be removed by either
party-whether he be plaintiff or defendant-a citizen of the state
in which the suit is brought, or a citizen of another-on his petition
filed in the state court, before or at the term at which the suit could
be first tried and before the trial.
The first subdivision of section 639 is doubtless superseded by the
more comprehensive provisions of the Act of 1875; and there is
much ground for the position that the second subdivision is likewise
superseded by a provision in the Act of 1875, which has not been
here mentioned; but I cannot perceive that subdivision three is
superseded by the latter act, or that the provisions of the two are
in any respect inconsistent.
The Act of 1875 provides that, when the suit presents a controversy between citizens of different states it may be removed by
either party on his petition, filed before or at the term at which the
suit could be first tried and before the trial. Subdivision three provides that when the suit is between a citizen of the state in which
it is brought and a citizen of another state, such citizen of the other
state may remove it on petition filed at any time before the tirial or
final hearing, if before or at the time he files the petition, he makes
his affidavit of "prejudice or local influence."
Taking the provisions together, it follows,
First-That no citizen of a state in which a suit is brought can
remove it, except on petition filed before or at the terim the suit
might first be tried.
Second-That when the suit is -between citizens of different states,
neither of whom is a citizen of the state in which the suit is brought,
neither party can remove it except on petition filed before or at the
term the suit might be first tried.
Third-But when the suit is between a citizen of the state in
which it is brought and a citizen of another state, the latter may
remove it on petition filed at any time before the trial or final hearing, if before or at the time he files his petition, he makes an affidavit
of "prejudice or local influence."
The first and second propositions are founded on the Act of 1875,
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and the third on subdivision three, and thus reading the provisions
of these statutes, they seem to me entirely consistent; nay, it appears
that the failure of the Act of 1875 to repeal subdivision three was
suggested by a sound policy.
In a suit between citizens of different states, when neither party
is a citizen of the state in which the suit is brought, there is no
ground for investing either party with more than his strict right
.of removal. There is no ground for supposing that "prejudice or
local influence" will affect one party more than the other, and therefore no ground of extending the time of his application beyond an
early stage in the cause. So when the suit is between a citizen of
the state in which it is brought and a citizen of another state, there
is no ground for supposing that "prejudice or local influence" will
operate against the former, and therefore there is no ground for
extending the term of his application; but when the suit is between
a citizen of the state in which it is brought and a citizen of another
state, there may be many instances where "prejudice or local influence" may prevent justice being done the latter. This prejudice
or local influence may not exist in the first stages of the cause, or,
if it existed, it may not then be discovered. It may be subsequently
dpveloped.
There seems, then, to be the most substantial reason for allowing
such citizen of another state to remove a suit at any stage before
trial or final hearing when it appears that, owing to such "prejudice
or local influence," he cannot obtain justice in the state court.
Here I might rest the argument, but I think it possible to make
the demonstration still more complete.
Subdivisions one and three of section 639, and the Act of 1875,
all authorize the removal of a suit on the petition of the defendant
when the suit is by a citizen of the state in which it is brought
against the citizen of another state. Of course I know that subdivision three also authorizes the removal of such a suit on the petition
of the plaintiff when he is not a citizen of the state in which the
suit is brought, and that the Act of 1875, not only authorizes the
removal of such suits, but of all suits between citizens of different
states at the instance of either party. But, as I wish to compare
the provisions which relate to the same character of suit, and to a
removal demanded by the same party, I omit all reference to the
provisions of subdivision three, and the Act of 1875, which relate
to a removal on the application of the plaintiff; and I also omit all
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* reference to the provisions of the Act of 1875, which authorize a
removal in any. suit between citizens of different states,- though
neither party-is a citizen of the state wherein the suit is brought.
I omit them because their presence only obscures the inquiry, by
,diverting the attention from the true question, .namely, the consist-'
ency or inconsistency between subdivisions one and .three, and the
Act of 1875, as they all relate to a suit of the same character; that
is, to a suit by a citizen of the state in which it il brought against a
citizen of another state, and to a removal demanded,.by the .samne

party.
I repeat, then, that subdivisions one and three; and the Act. of
of 1875, all authorize the defendant to demand a removal in a suit
by a citizen of the state in which-the suit is brought against a citizen
of another state.
By subdivision bne-lhe may have a removal on petition filed at
the time he enters his appearance in the state court.
By the Act of 1875, he may have it on petition filed before"or at
the term the cause could be first tried, and before the trial.
By the third. subdivision, he may have it on petition filed before
the trial or final hearing of the suit, if, before or at-the time of filing
of said petition, he make and file an affidavit as to- prejudice or
local influence.
. It is thus readily seen that the provision of the Act of 1875
is inconsistent with that of subdivision one. Each covers precisely
the same-ground, and, of course, both cannot stand. But it is just
as readily seen that there is no inconsistency whatever between sub-'
division three and the Act of 1875. The one confines the 4p!l'tion to a limited'time; the other extends the time for a good and
substantial reason. Indeed, it must be seen that there is as perfect
consistency between subdivision three and the Act of- 1875 as between subdivisions one and three.
I have not overlooked the opposing argument founded on the title
and the general scope of the Act of 1875. It is entitled "An Act
to determine the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts of the Ufnited
States, and to regulate the removal of causes from state courts, and
for other purposes." To determine the jurisdiction of Circuit Cours
seems to imply that.this act only is to be referred to in order to
determine what the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts is. "1To regulate the removal of causes from the state courts" seems to imply
that in this act only are to be found the rules which govern .the
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removal of causes. But the title of an act is entitled to little or no
consideration in determining the meaning of provisions found in
the body, and can never work the repeal of a prior act by its own
force. If the provisions of the last act are consistent with those of
the first, such consistent provisions remain in force, however clearly
the legislature may have indicated, in the title of the last act, an
intention to .repeal the former.
Nor is the argument founded on the scope of the act more forcible.
Its scope is, indeed, broad. It greatly enlarges the civil jurisdiction
of the Circuit Courts, but it does not embrace the whole. It limits
the jurisdiction which it confers to suits "where the matter in dispute exceeds $500 ;" but there are several provisions of the Revised
Statutes which'extend the jurisdiction to suits involving less than
this amount. See section 629, subdivisions 10, 11, 12, 16 and 17.
Nor can it be contended that it embraces all prior acts which relate
to the removal of suits. See sects. 640, 641, 643, Rev. Stats.
Of course, as it do.es not embrace all prior acts which confer jurisdiction -or authorize removal of suits, and does not, in terms, repeal
them, it cannot, under any rule of interpretation, be held to repeal
them by implication.
At one time, during the course of this investigation, I was strongly
inclined to 'think that, although the Act of 1875 does not either
in terms or by implication, repeal all prior acts which relate to the
removal of civil causes from state courts to the Circuit Courts of
the United States, it should be held to furnish the one rule for the
removal of all such suits as it authorized to be removed, and thus to
repeal all prior acts which prescribe a different rule; that as it
authorizes and prescribes a rule for the removal of all suits in which
there is a controversy between citizens of different states, it repeals
by implication all* prior acts which relate to the removal of similar
suits, and that, as subdivision three does relate to the removal of a
similar suit, that is, a suit between a citizen of the state wherein
it is brought and a citizen of another state, which is certainly included in a suit between citizens of different states, it is repealed.
But subsequent reflection has satisfied me that this argument is
more.specious than sound, and that its whole force is derived from
its omission to notice the provision in subdivision three relating to
"prejudice or local influence," which is nowhere found in the Act
of 1875.
It is true, I suppose, that Congress cannot authorize the removal
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of a suit to the Circuit Court, of which it cannot confer original
jurisdiction on that court, and it is true that Congress cannot confer jurisdiction on the Circuit Court to try an ordinary suit between
citizens of the same state on the ground of prejudice against one
party or of local influence of the other; but it is also true that
within the constitutional limits of the jurisdiction it may rest the
right of removal upon such grounds as it deems best. It may authorize none to be removed, except on the ground of prejudice in
the state tribunal against the party asking the removal, or the local
influence of the opposite party, or it may authorize the removal of
suits between citizens of different states where nothing more is shown
than different citizenship at one stage of the proceedings, and the
same suits to be removed at another stage, when prejudice, local
influence or other matter is shown. Now, this is precisely what is
accomplished by the joint operation of the Act of 1875 and subdivision three. The former requires the application for the removal
of all suits, including a suit between a citizen of the state in which
it is brought and a citizen of another state, when nothing more than
different citizenship appears, to be made before or at the time at
which the cause could be first tried. The latter allows the application for the removal of such a suit to be made at any time before
trial or final hearing, when it also appears that the applicant is not
a citizen of the state wherein the suit is brought, and that, owing to
prejudice or local influence, he could not obtain justice in the state
court.

But were the consistency between the Act of 1875 and of subdivision three less apparent, I should still be constrained, in view of
the leaning of courts against implied repeals, to hold that the latter
is still in force.
"To repeal a statute by implication, there must be such positive
repugnancy between the provisions of the new law and the old, that
they cannot stand together or be consistently reconciled :" Wood v.
United States, 16 Pet. 842; Cool v. Smith, 1 Black 459; United
States v. Tynen, 11 Wall. 92 ; H7artfordv. United States, 8 Cranch
109; Brown v. County Commissioners, 21 Penna. 27; Brown v.
Dean, 5 Hill 221; 1Daruss, fc., v. Pairbairn,ft., 3 How. 639;
Potter's Dwarris on Statutes 154; Sedgwick on Statute and Constitutional Law 129.
In Wood v. United States, Mr. Justice STORY said: "There
must be a positive repugnancy between the provisions of the new
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laws and those of the old; and, even then, the old law is repealed
by iml)lication only lro tanto to the extent of the repugnancy."
IT Cool v. Smith, Mr. Justice SWAYNE, quoting Mr. Sedgwick,
said: "A repeal by implication is not favored." "The leaning of
the courts is against the doctrine, if it be possible to reconcile, the
two acts of the legislature together."
Mr. Dwarris says: "Every affirmative statute is a repeal of a precedent affirmative statute when its matter necessarily implies a
negative, but only so far as it is clearly and indisputably contradictory and contrary to the former act in the very matter (Foster Case),
and the repugnancy such that the two acts cannot be reconciled."
A citation of these authorities was hardly necessary to support
the argument in this case. The provisions of the Act of 1875, and
those of subdivision three, have been shown to be perfectly consistent. The latter, therefore, must be held to remain unrepealed
without invoking any technical rule of construction, or relying on
the disfavor in which the courts hold implied repeals; but I have
not thought such citation entirely out of place, since, if doubt
remains in the mind of any one after reading the preceding abstract
decision, it must be dispelled on considering the authorities.
Let an order be entered overruling the plaintiff's motion.

Supreme Court of Michigan.
AUSTIN B. WEBBER v. HOWE & HUBBELL.
Where A., a.resident of Michigan, gives an order in that state to B., a citizen
and resident of Ohio, for the purchase of liquors, and B. accepts it in Michigan,
it is a contract made in Michigan, and void under the liquor law of that state.
Had B. been a mere agent, without authority to sell, but merely to take orders
for transmission to Ohio for acceptance there, the contract might have been sustained as an Ohio contract.
The fact that the contract was not a completed sale until the liquor should be
actually set apart from the vendor's stock, and that that act was to be done in
Ohio, will not prevent it from falling within the prohibition of the Michigan law
against all "contracts relating to liquors," &c.
Even though the order would have been void under the Statute of Frauds for
want of writing, and therefore without effect until acted upon by the delivery
of the goods to a carrier in Ohio, it is nevertheless a Michigan contract, for if the
order was void there was nothing to bind the purchaser till his acceptance of the
goods when delivered in Michigan.
A contract void when made because of a statutory prohibition may be validated
VOL. XXV.-54
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by subsequent legislation, but a repeal of the prohibitory statute, "saving all
causes of action which have accrued," will not validate a contract made while the
statute was in force.
ERROR to Wayne Circuit. This was an actiofi upon an acceptance,
to which the defence made was, that the consideration therefor was
the sale of intoxicating liquors by plaintiffs, who were Ohio dealers,
to defendant, a Michigan dealer.

.Maybury and (onely, for plaintiff in error.
Griffin and .Dickerson, for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
COOLEY, C. J.-The circuit judge charged the jury that if the
order for the liquors, though taken in Michigan, was filled in
Ohio, and the liquors were shipped in Ohio, and the defendant
received them in Detroit and paid the freight, then the plaintiff
would be entitled to recover. This instruction must assume that
the contract was an Ohio contract; being completed by the accept=ace and filling of the order in that state. Had the order been
sent fromt his state to dealers in Ohio and filled there, or had an
agent of the Ohio parties who had no authority to agree upon sales
taken the order in this state and transmitted it to his principals who
accepted and filled it, we think the instruction might have been
sustained: McIntyre v. Parks, 3 Mete. 207; Orcutt v. NYelson,
1 Gray 536; Garlandv. Lane, 46 N. H. 245; .Kling v. -Mies,33
Mich. 275. But the order was taken here by one of the plaintiffs in person, aid the acceptance, as well as the giving of it, took
place in this state. There are some cases which have decided that,
even under such circumstances, the sale is not completed until the
property is actually separated from the stock in the store and delivered to the carrier in pursuance of the order: Sortwell v. Hughes,
1 Curt. C. C. 244; Abberger v. Marvin, 102 Mass. 70; -Jolanv.
Green, 70 Id. 322 ; but these cases are not important here, since
whether the contract or sale was executory or actually completed by
delivery it was equally invalid under our statute. The statute
not only avoided all sales, but "all contracts or agreements relating
thereto :" Comp. L. 2137.
It was suggested on the argument that, as the agreement was for
the purchase of goods to the amount of more than fifty dollars, it
was void uinder the Statute of Frauds for want of writing, and con-
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sequently did not take effect as an agreement until acted upon by
the delivery of the goods to a carrier in Ohio. But if we assume
the original invalidity of the agreement in this state on this ground
it cannot we think, help the vendor. If void originally it would
not become binding upon the purchaser until he should do something in ratification of it, ind it does not appear that anything
further was done by him until the liquors were received in this
state. His void order could not make any carrier to whom the
vendor should see fit to deliver the goods his agent. The case
must therefore stand either upon the original order, or upon the
reception of the goods at Detroit under it; and in either case the
contract must be regarded as a Michigan contract: Hanson v.
Armitage, 5 B. & Ald. 557; Acebar v. Levy, 10 Bing. 376;
-Morton v. Tibbit, 15 Ad. & E. 428 ; Bushel v. W-heeler, 15 Q.
B. 442; Norman v. Phillitps, 14 M. & W. 277; _arrinav. Home,
16 Id. 119 ; Outwater v. Doge, 6 Wend. 400 ; Lloyd v. Wright,
25 Geo. 215; Spencer v. Hale, 30 Vt. 314; O'Neill v. N. Y., C.
- H. Railroad Co., 58 N. Y. 138; Sheppard v. Pressey, 32 N.
H. 49; Hart v. Bush, E., Bl. & El. 494; Curry v. Anderson,
2 El. & El. 592; had this suit, therefore, been brought while
the statute which forbade such contracts remained in force, there
could be no question but the plaintiff must fail.
That statute, however, has been repealed, and the plaintiffs rely
upon the repeal as taking away all impediment to a recovery. It
was, it is said, in the nature of a penal statute. And when it was
repealed, all penal consequences, including the inhibition to maintain
suits for liquors sold fell with it: Fngle v. Shurts, 1 Mich. 150 ;
Wielch v. Wadsworth, 30 Conn. 149; Confiscation Cases, 7 Wall.
454.
The prohibitory liquor law expressly made all contracts the consideration for which in whole or in part was the sale of liquors
utterly null and void, except in certain specified cases of which this
was not one. It also declared all moneys and securities received on
such sales to be received without consideration, and authorized them
it be recovered back: Comp. L. 1871, ch. 69. While this was in
force the sale in question was made. The law was repealed in
1875, "saving all actions pending and all causes of action which
have accrued" at the time the repealing act took effect: Public
Laws 1875, pp. 279, 280.
It has often been decided that a contract invalid at the time it
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was made for want of compliance with some statutory provision, or
because of some statutory prohibition, might be validated by legislation afterwards: Lews v. 1Je1lvain, 16 Ohio 347; Savings Bank
v. Allen, 28 Conn. 97; Andrews v. Russell, 7 Blackford 474;
Parmelee v. Lawrence, 48 Ill. 331; ]Dulancy's Lessee v. TilyIman, 6 G. & J. 46; Journeay v. Gibson, 56 Penna. St. 5T; Carpenter v. Pennsylvania,17 How. 456 ; Dentzell v. JFaldie, 30 Cal.
138; Estate of Sticknoth, 7 Nev. 223; Gibson v. JHibbard, 13
Mich. 215. But this case is not like those referred to. Here the
statute has not undertaken to validate the void agreement, but has
left it as it was, "utterly null and void." A suit cannot be
brought upon it, because no contract ever existed. The repealing
law, instead of indicating a purpose to validate such agreements,
indicates the contrary purpose.
It only remaind to consider a claim made by defendant to recover
by way of set-off for moneys previously paid by him for liquors,
and which, according to the law then in force, were paid without
consideration. We have no doubt of his right to set-off these
moneys if he proved the payment. This he claims to have shown
by proving the payment by him of orders drawn by the plaintiffs in
favor of third persons. We cannot see why this proof is not complete. Plaintiff relied upon Buckley v. Saze, 10 Mich. 328. But
that case was quite different. There, to prove that he had paid
moneys on a bet, the plaintiff produced a note he had given for the
sum bet; and this alone, it was held, did not prove the payment
of money on the bet. Here the payment is proved, and as it was
made on the drafts drawn by the plaintiffs on the defendant, it was
in law a payment to the plaintiffs themselves.
The judgment must be reversed, with costs, and a new trial
ordered.
Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
DAVIESS COUNTY COURT,

APPELLANT, V.

A. G. HOWARD

ET.

AL., APPELLEES.

A county, under legislative authority, having voted to subscribe $250,000 to the
stock of a railroad company, and the legislation permitting bonds to be issued for
the amount so subscribed, the county court issued bonds and sold them at a large
discount, until enough were sold to pay the $250,000. Held, that the county

board exceeded its powers in issuing bonds to a larger amount than the sum subscribed.
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An authority to issue bonds to a specified amount, is not an authority to sell
bonds to raise that amount.
The county court having thus exceeded its powers, cannot by any subsequent
action affirn and validate its unauthorized proceedings. Express legislation would
be necessary for that purpose.
On a bill filed by tax-payers to enjoin the levy of a tax to pay interest on the
bonds issued in excess of $250,000, it appeared that the bonds were all sold to the
railroad company in whose aid they were voted, and consequently with full knowledge on the part of its officers of all the flicts. Ifeld, that the relief prayed for
should be granted, as the bonds in excess of the sum permitted were nullities in
the hands of the company.

APPEAL

from Daviess Circuit Court.

TV.N. Sweeney and James Wier & Son, for the County Court.
George W. Jolly, for the taxpayers.
PRYOR, J.-This is an appeal in the name of the Daviess County
Court against A. G. Howard and others, taxpayers of the county
of Daviess.
The Owensboro and Russellville Railroad Company was chartered by an act of the legislature, passed in the year 1867. By
the nineteenth section of the act of incorporation it was provided
"that the county courts of Daviess, Ohio; Muhlenburg, and Logan
counties shall have power, and are hereby authorized, to subscribe
to the capital stock of the company in such number of shares as
may be determined by said county courts respectively, and to levy
upon the taxpayers of such counties respectively such taxes as may
be necessary to pay the stock subscribed, and the said county courts
may, if they shall deem it prudent, issue the bonds of said counties
respectively for the amount of stock subscribed, or any part thereof,
said bonds to be in such sums, and payable at such times, as said
county courts may determine upon. That before such stock shall
be subscribed by the county courts, the said county courts shall
submit to .the voters of said counties the proposition to subscribestock and the amount thereof (to be suggested and fixed by the commissioners named herein), at an election to be held after due
notice," &c.
The commissioners for Daviess county, in accordance with this
provision of the charter, suggested to the county court a submission
to the voters of the question, "Will the voters instruct the county
court to subscribe 10,000 sbares to the capital stock of the company ?"
The vote was regularly and properly taken, and a majority of the
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voters favoring the subscription, the sum of $'250,000 was subscribed
and taken by the county as stock in the corporation, the shares
being twenty-five dollars each.
At the July Term of the Daviess county court, held in the year
1868, it was ordered that George W. Triplett, the county judge, W.
B. Tyler and E. C. Berry be and are hereby appointed a committee
on behalf of the county court of Daviess county, "to have bonds
executed and prepared of a sufficient amount to satisfy and pay off
the subscription on the part of the county of Daviess to the Owensboro and Russellville Railroad Company. That said bonds be executed and made payable as follows, viz. : $50,000 five years from
date, $50,000 ten years from date, $75,000 fifteen years from date,
$75,000 twenty years from date, the bonds bearing interest at six
per cent. per annum, payable semi-annually, for the payment of
which coupons were attached," &c.
The committee, or a majority, were authorized by this order "to
sell or dispose of the bonds, either to the Owensboro and Russellville
Railroad Company, or to individuals, or to other corporations, on
such terms as said committee may deem best and most advisable to
the interests of the county of Daviess in paying the subscription," &c.
At a subsequent term of the court, held in the same month, July
1868, it was recited "that as the court had ordered the committee
to have bonds prepared and executed in a sufficient amount to satisfy and pay off the subscription, and to sell and dispose of said bonds
either to individuals or corporations: It is now ordered, that said
order be so amended as to authorize said _immittee to appoint agents
to sell said bonds."
Under these orders of the county court the bonds of the county
were executed, not only for the $250,000 and its interest, but for
the additional sum of $67,850, making the whole amount of interestbearing bonds, with coupons attached, $817,850.
These bonds, as is alleged in the petition, were sold to the railroad
company in discharge of the county subscription, and many of them
are now in the hands of parties unknown to the plaintiff in the
action. A tax has been levied on the taxpayers of the county to
pay the bonds as they matured, and the accruing interest on the
whole amount.
The plaintiffs, the taxpayers of the county, instituted the present
action in which they seek to enjoin the county court from collecting
either the principal or interest upon the bonds issued in excess of
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the $250,000, insisting that the county court, as the agent of the
taxpayers, exceeded its authority in making sale of any of the bonds,
and that the bonds other than those directed to be issued by the
order of the county court made in July 1868, are void.
The county court or its committee acted upon the idea that it
was invested with the power to execute and sell at a discount as
many bonds as were necessary to raise the money to pay the subscription of $250,000. This is the sole question presented by the
record. It is alleged in the petition that the railroad company, the
Planters' Bank and others, are the holders of some of these bonds,
and as they were made defendants to the action, and the court refused to pass upon the question as to the liability of the county to
them, the appellees, the taxpayers have prayed a cross-appeal. This
cross-appeal cannot be considered, as the parties against whom it is
prayed, or who are to be affected by it, are not before the court.
The court below has enjoined the county court from proceeding to
collect the interest on the bonds in excess of the $250,000. These
defendants, if they hold any such bonds, are not complaining, as
they had failed to prosecute any appeal. The appeal is here by the
Daviess county court against the taxpayer, that tribunal insisting
upon its right to levy the tax to pay the interest on all the bonds
issued and sold to satisfy the county subscription. The controversy
is between the agent and the principal.
The county court by virtue of the nineteenth section of the act
incorporating the railroad company, was invested with the power to
pay the county subscription by levying a tax upon the property of
the citizen, or by issuing county bonds in whole or in part discharge
of the indebtedness.
The power to issue bonds was limited in amount to the sum subscribed by the county to the capital stock, and the county court,
looking to the extent of the power with which it was clothed by the:
act in question, designated the number and amount of bonds to be
issued by an order of that court made in July 1868. This order
directed the execution of bonds for $50,000, payable in five years,
a like amount payable in ten years, $75,000 payable in fifteen years,
and a like sum payable in twenty years, with interest coupons attached, payable semi-annually. This covered the entire subscription,
and when issued, it was proper for the county court to deliver them
over to the railroad company in payment of the subscription made by
the county. These were all interest-bearing bonds, and when exe-
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cuted by the county for the amount of stock subscribed, the county
court acted within the scope of the authority conferred by the act,
and exhausted all the power that tribunal had to discharge the
indebtedness in that manner. The act expressly authorized the
county court to issue bonds for the amount of stock subscribed, but
we find no power conferred by the charter upon the county court
to issue bonds for $320,000. It was a cash subscription, and the
interest-bearing bonds are to be regarded as equivalent to a cash
payment, and, if the railroad company declined to accept them, in
discharge of the subscription, it was the duty of the county court
to raise the money by taxation.
That tribunal had no right either by reason of its jurisdiction
over the subject-matter or by the letter or spirit of section 19 of
the railroad charter, to issue bonds for an unlimited amount, and
then place them upon the market at a discount in order to satisfy
the debt to the railroad company. The power to issue the bonds
does not imply the power to sell.
No general power is conferred upon county courts to issue such
bonds or to subscribe stock in behalf of the county in which the
tribunal exists to railroad companies or other corporations, and
when this extraordinary power is'conferred by legislative enactment
by which a bare majority of the votes cast may impose upon a large
minority of the citizens or taxpayers, a taxation by which they are
to be burdened for years, courts should not be inclined to disregard,
although it may be done by a liberal construction, the conditions
and restrictions placed by the legislature upon such an. exercise of
power. The powers conferred by such legislation should be strictly
pursued, and the fact that the county has incurred the liability cannot be held to justify any action the county court may see proper
to take in order to secure its payment. In this case the voter agreed
to be taxed in the sum of $250,000, the debt to be discharged by a
direct tax, or by the issuing of bonds for that amount bearing
interest. He has agreed to pay that sum, and to say that because
he voted to pay that amount-he is liable to pay the additional sum
of 570,000 is not warranted by the letter or spirit of the law conferring the power on the county court to tax him or in consonance
with natural justice.
If the legislature had been asked to vest in the county court of
Daviess the power- to raise by taxation the sum of $320,000, the
whole sum bearing interest, to pay this debt of $250,000, would
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such a proposition have received serious consideration; or if such
authority had been expressly given, is it to be presumed that the
taxpayer would have been so regardless of his own interest as to
cast his vote in fi'vor of the measure? It was never contemplated.
that these bonds should be sold at a discount, either by the county
court or by the railroad company, so as to make the county responsible for the deficit. The power to sell the bonds to raise the money
to pay for the stock was not given by the act. The bonds bearing.
interest were worth as much as the stock subscribed, and so regarded,
no doubt, by the legislature when enacting the law. The county
court, in fact, never authorized the issuing of bonds for a greater
amount than $250,000, and if that tribunal had the right to exceed
power conferred upon it, still it has not attempted to exercise this
right except by a levy of the tax upon the citizen to pay the interest.
It is maintained by the county court that, because it has once levied
the tax, or continued to do so since the bonds were issued to jty
the interest, this amounts to a ratification of the action of the county
court by the taxpayers of the coitnty. That the county court obtained all the power that could be properly exercised with reference
to this question of taxation from the 19th section of the act incorporating the railroad company, is too plain for controversy. The
county court, in issuing the bonds in excess of the 8250,000, or
permitting it to be done by the committee appointed by the court,
transcended the authority given by the legislature, and no subsequent
act of the county court, or of the taxpayer, can make valid the
exercise of a power that had no legal sanction.
The corporation knew the extent of the power given the county
court by the act incorporating the company. It received the bonds
and is not complaining of the action of the court below. The action
of the county court in collecting the tax upon the over-issue of
of bonds, or the interest, was clearly illegal. They were nullities
in the hands of the county court or the corporation, and the payment by the unwilling taxpayer cannot justify this unwarranted
exercise of power. The voters of the county had no right to
assume the burden except in the manner provided by the act. They
could not ratify an act that neither the county court nor themselves
had the power to perform. If the principal could not exercise the
right it is difficult to perceive how his sanctioning its exercise by an
agent could make it legal.
VOL. XXV.-55
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In making the over-issue the county court, or its committee, acted

beyond the scope of its agency, and outside of the power gihen lby
the legislature. The only way in which the people could ratify it
would be by a vote under a legislative enactment.
It is argued by counsel for the appellant (the county court) that
there is no reason to discriminate between the holders of these bonds
on account of the date of the purchase, and that there is no means
of determining which of them are valid and which are not. This
question cannot, well arise between the county court and the tax.payer, and as there has been an excessive issue, the coftnty court
cannot complain of the injunction. It does not appear who has possession of the bonds. It is alleged that they were delivered or sold
to the corporation, the railroad company. It was made a party
defendant, and does not ask to have any equitable distribution of the
fund, or to disclose even to whom it has transferred these bonds.
The judgment below enjoining the county court from proceeding to
collect the over-issue of bonds or the interest, by levying a tax upon
the property of the appellees, is affirmed, and the cross-appeal of
the appellees dismissed without prejudice.

RECENT ENGLISH

DECISIONS

(CONDENSED).

Court of Appeal in Chancery.
EAGLESFIELD v. MARQUIS OF LONDONDERRY.
The L. Railway Company was authorized by its acts of incorporation to issue
I90,0U01. preference shares and a large amount of ordinary shares. In 1864 it was
amalgamated by Act of Parliament with the Cambrian Company, up to which time
it had issued 85,0001. preference shares, which ranked as No. I preference stock,
and 60 00l. ordinary shares, which ranked as No. 2 preference stock, and power
was reserved to the Cambrian Company, to raise any capital which either of the
amalgamated companies had power to raise prior to the amalgamation. Thedirectors of the amalgamated company, under a bonAt fide belief that they were authorized
to raise 15,0001. additional preference shares of the L. Company, and to make
them rank with the 85,0001. No. I preference stock, issued 15,000L shares of
preference stock, and described them as No. I preference stock in the certificates,
which were signed by the directors and the secretary, and which were handed to
the plaintiff at the time he purchased some of the stock. Itwas subsequently
decided that the new stock was not No. I preference stock, but ranked below it.
Hield, that the purchaser had not been deceived by any misrepresentation of fact, and
his bill was dismissed.

THis bill was filed in 1874, alleging that the plaintiff had been
4 Chan. Div. 693-718.
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deceived by the form in which the stock had been issued and the
certificates made, as set forth in the syllabus, and praying that the
company, the directors, and the secretary, all of whom were made
defendants, migllt be held responsible jointly and severally for the
misrepresentation.
For the plaintiffs it was argued that the defendants were jointly
and severally liable for the loss occasioned to the plaintiffs by the
untrue representation contained in the certificate, that the stock
purchasced was preference stock. The bona fides of a false representation made no difference; citing liz re Bahia & San rancisco
Railway Co., Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 584; Burrowes v. Lock, 10 Ves.
470; Slim v. Crouq'her, 1 D. F. & J. 518; Reese River Silver
XIhinbig Co. v. Smith, Law Rep. 4 1H. L. 64; Peek v. Gurney,
Id. 6 I. L. 377; Ship v. £rosskill, Id. 10 Eq. 73; Swift v.
Winterbotham, Id. 8 Q. B. 244; Pickard v. Sears, 6 A. & E.
469 ; Freeman v. Cooke, 2 Ex. 654.
For the defendants it was argued that the misrepresentation was
one of law, being occasioned by the erroneous construction put by
the directors upon the Acts of Parliament authorizing tile issue of
stock; hence defendants were not accountable: Beattie v. Lord
Ebury, Law Rep. 7 I. L. 102. But assuming that there was a
misrepresentation of fact, there was no evidence that the plaintiffs
acted upon the directors' misrepresentation; the directors would not
be liable in an action of deceit: Swift v. Jewsbury, Law Rep. 9 Q.
B. 301 ; Rashdall v. Ford,Id. 2 Eq. 750.
The Master of the Rolls, Sir G. JESSEL, made a decree for the
complainant, from which this appeal was taken. On appeal the
following cases were cited in addition: Hart v. Frontino Cold
Mining Co., Law Rep. 5 Ex. 111 ; Hendersonv. Lacon, Id. 5 Eq.
249; Scott v. Dixon, 29 L. J. (Ex.) 62 n.; Barry v. Croskey,
2 J. & I. 1 ; Mackey v. Commercial Bank of New Brunswick,
Law Rep. 5 P. C. 394; Aew Brunswick Railway Co. v. Conybarre,
9 11. L. 0. 711; Hay/craft v. Creasy, 2 East 92; Orrnrod v.
Mluth, 14 M. & W. 651; Stephens v. Dellledina, 4 Q. B. 422;
Western Bank of Scotland v. Addle, Law Rep. 1 H. L. Sc. 145;
Barwick v. English.JoTint Ftock Bank, Law Rep. 2 Ex. 259.
JAMES, L. J., said that the appeal must be allowed, since the
plaintiff had not shown that lie relied upon the misrepresentation.
The whole misrepresentation consisted of this, that the vendor of
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the stock sold it to the plaintiff, and a transfer was then sent to the
company of "10,0001. of 5 per cent. preference stock No. 1," and
across the certificate was written by the secretary, by authority of
the directors, "coupons for 10,0001. preference stock, forwarded
to the companies by (the vendor) are held by me to meet this transfer." The representation was meant to apply to the stock of 15,0001.
issued to the Cambrian Company. The misrepresentation to sustain the bill must be wilful and fraudulent; this was not the case
here, nor had the plaintiff shown that he had relied upon and been
deceived by the misrepresentation. The certificate did not say that
the stock transferred was part of the 85,0001. stock, nor did the
plaintiff allege that he so believed, lie merely alleged that he believed
that he was getting genuine No. 1 stock; but lie might have believed
that the stock wag part of the 15,0001. issued, and yet that it was
genuiue No. 1 preference stock, that is, that it ranked equal to the
85,0001. issued. Then he had delayed filing his bill from 1869,
when he was informed of the probability that his stock was not genuine No. I stock, till 1874 ; that alone would be decisive against him.
BAGGALLAY, J. A., and BRAMWELL, J. A., concurred.

Appeal allowed and bill dismissed with costs.

Court of Appeal in Chancery.
MASTER v. ItANSARD. I
Where a personal covenant is made by a tenant not to muild without the land-

lord's approval, a subsequent lessee of the same landlord of an adjoining plot
cannot compel the landlord to enforce for his benefit the covenant with the first
tenant.
THE owner of two adjoining plots of land leased one for a term
to A., and subsequently the other for a term to B. A. and B. at
the time of their respective leases, covenanted respectively that they
would not during the term do on the demised premises anything
which would be an annoyance to the lessor and his tenants, or build
on the ground demised, without first submitting the plans to the
lessor, and obtaining his approval. Within twenty years A., with
the approval of the lessor, began to build upon his ground, so as to
darken B.'s windows. B. filed a bill to restrain A. from erecting,
and the lessor from approving the building objected to.

14 Chan.

Div. 718-724.
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BACO-N, V. C., held that the plaintiff could not claim to have the
restrictive covenant made by A. with the common landlord enforced
by the latter, in her, B's., favor, but directed an inquiry as to
damages, whereupon A. appealed. For B. it was argued, that if
the common landlord had remained the owner and in possession of
the property leased to A., he could not have built so as to darken
B.'s, the plaintiff's, windows, for that would have been in derogation of his grant. If the grantor had such an interest in the
adjoining property that he could have protected the easements
which could have been enjoyed, if the adjoining property belonged
absolutely to him, he was bound to protect them. [BRAMWELL,
J. A.-Suppose the grant to A. had been in fee, would the covenant have run with the land?] It would. Swansborough v.
Coventry, 9 Bing. 305; Booth v. Alcock, Law Rep. 8 Ch. 663;
.Eastwood v. Lever, 4 D. J. & S. 114; Western v. AfacDermott,
Law Rep. 2 Ch. 72; Keates v. Lyon, Law Rep. 4 Oh. 218;
CMild Y. -Douglas, Kay 560, were referred to.
BRA-MWELL,

J. A., was of the opinion that the appeal must be

allowed. The doctrine as to the disposition by the owner of two
tenembnts, did not apply. The grantor at the time of the grant
to the plaintiff was not the owner of the land on which A. had
built, in the sense of being able to make a grant of an easement
over it, and there was therefore no reason why the law should imply
a grant of it. Suppose the first grantees had covenanted to erect
no buildings, and then trespassers had come in and built; could the
plaintiff have called on the landlord fo turn them.out? So if the
lessees had erected buildings, the plaintiff, in the absence of any
covenant by her landlord to that effect, could not have called upon
the landlord to enforce against the lessees their covenant not to
build.
It would have been monstrous to hold that the covenant, the
existence of which was- not even communicated to the plaintiff,
when her lease was taken, could be construed as enuring to her
benefit.
JAMEs,

L. J., and

Bill dismissed.

BAGGALLAY,

J. A., concurred.

IN RE NEWMAN.

Court of Appeal in Ohancery.
IN RE NEWMAN.

EX PARTE CAPPER.'

Where articles contain covenants for the performance of several things, and one
large sum is stated at the end to be paid upon breach of performance, that sum
must be considered as a penalty. But where it is agreed that, if a party do a particular thing, such a sum shall be paid by him, there the sum stated may be treated
as liquidated damages.

A CONTRACT for the erection of buildings to be used as a school,
provided that they should be completed by a certain date, and that
in default thereof the contractors should forfeit to the employer
101. per week for every week after that date, for which the building
should remain unfinished; and, also, that if the contractors were
prevented by bankruptcy or any other cause from completing, the
employer might rescind, and that the money already paid should
be considered the full value of the works executed. There were
various other stipulations, and a final provision that in case the contract should not be in all things duly performed by the contractors,
they should pay to the employer 10001. as and for liquidated damages. The buildings were not completed until long after the time
fixed in the contract, on account of 'the contractors having become
insolvent prior to that date. Subsequently the employer tendered
a proof against the contractors' estate, for the 10001. as liquidated
damages for the breach of the agreement. No particular damage
was alleged.
BACON, C. J., held that the 10001. had been inserted as liquidated
damages, and allowed proof of that sum against the contractors'
estate in bankruptcy. On appeal for the employer, the appellee,
it was argued that this was not the case of a large sum being specified as damages for the small one, in which case the court might
construe the sum as a penalty, notwithstanding it was spoken of as
liquidated damages. The court could not in this case estimate the
damage caused by the non-opening and completing of the schools
at the time fixed otherwise than by taking the estimate of the parties.
Atkyns v. Kinnier, 4 Ex. 776; Galsworthy v. Strutt, 1 Id. 659;
Magee v. Lavell, Law Rep. 9 C. P. 107 ; Reilly v. Jones, 1 Ping.
302; Betts v. Burch, 4 H. & M. 506; Green v. -Priee,13 M. &
W. 695, and Kemble v. Farren,6 Bing. 141, were referred to.
14
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JA-mEs, L. J., said that the ratio decidendi of Kemble v. _Farren,
siqra, was that wherever there was a sum mentioned in the end of
a contract as damages for the non-performance of any of a great
number of stipulations, there it must be treated as a penalty. The
law was satisfactorily stated by HEATH, J., in Astley v. Weldon, 2
B. & P. 346, 353, as follows: "Where articles contain covenants
for the performance of several things, and then one large sum is
stated at the end to be paid upon breach of performance, that must
be considered as a penalty. But where it is agreed that if a party
do such a particular thing, such a sum shall be paid by him, there
the sum stated may be treated as liquidated damages."
BAGGALLAY, J. A., concurred, referring to the language of Lord
WESTnUrY

in Thompson v. JHudson, Law Rep. 4 II. L. 1, 30.

BRAMWELL, J.

A., concurred.

Appeal allowed and order reversed

eie C-hancellor's Court.
ECCLESIASTICAL COMMISSIONERS FOR ENGLAND v. NORTH
EASTERN RAILWAY COMPANY.'
Equity follows the law in refusing relief, where time has etapsed which at law
would have barred the claim. But where the statute is sought to be used against
good conscience and the plaintiff has not been guilty of laches, equity will remove
the legal bar arising from lapse of time.
Where therefore a legal fraud has been committed (in this case a trespass upon
the plaintiff's coal mines by an adjoining owner, more than six years before the
bill was filed), but which was not discovered or discoverable by the plaintiff until a
reasonable time (some two years) before the bill was filed, the Statute of Limitations is not a good defence.
The working of mines by the defendant's predecessor in title, a railway company, was admittedly ultra rites, and possibly this would have been a defence to
the defendant, a company with which the first was subsequently amalgamated, for
trespasses committed by the first company, in mining coal, by trespassing upon
the plaintiff's adjoining mines. An Act of P'arliament was passed, when the
wrongful acts were in course of commission, by which the trespassing -companywas authorized to sell their mines within five years. Held, that the act of mining,
though originally unlawful, was impliedly recognised and ratified by the permission
in the Act of Parliament to sell the mines, and that the defendant was therefore
liable for its predecessor's trespasses committed in the course of an act (mining)
originally ultra wires.
14 Chan. Div. 845-868.
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Wrongful acts (in this case of trespass) are not condoned by a subsequent
general release, where the party injured has no ground for suspecting the particu-

lar wrongful acts complained of, and the release was by him intended to operate
upon a different subject-matter.

BILL filed in 1872, for an account of coals taken in 1863, from
a colliery of the plaintiff's by the West Iartlepool Railway Company,
the adjoining owner, which in 1865 was amalgamated with the
defendant company and its property transferred to the latter company, subject to all existing contracts, debts, engagements and
obligations affecting the same, &c. In 1862, the boundaries of the
two mines were settled by mutual agreement, and after some
lengthy negotiations, a release was executed in 1864, by which all
previous wrongful acts were condoned and released on both sides. An
Act of Parliament was passed in 1863, by which the West Iartlepool Railway Company were required to sell their mines within
five years. The trespass was not discovered nor, as the Vice
Chancellor found from the evidence, discoverable till 1870.
The defence was (1) ultra vires, the West Hartlepool Company
having no power by its charter to work coal mines. If it had been
intended by the act of 1868 to allow the company to work the
mines, power would have been expressly given them to do so:
Green v. Londam General Omnibus Company, 7 0. B. N. S.
290; Maund v. Canal Co., 4 Man. & G. 452; ffouldsworth v. -Evans,
Law Rep. 3 H. L. 263; Asbury Co. v. 1?iche, Id. 7 H. L. 653; (2)
the release of all prior claims, whether by trespass or otherwise;
(3) the Statute of Limitations: In re Kensington Station Act, L. R.
20 Eq. 197; In re Stead's Mortgaged Estates, 2 Ch. D. 718;
ifovenden v. Lord Annesley, 2 Sch. & Lef. 607, 613. The trespass here was committed more than six years before filing the bill.
Brooksbank v. Smith, 2 Y. & C. Ex. 58, was distinguishable. Denys
v. STuckburg, 4 Y. & C. Ex. 42, decided that if a man had means of
discovering the alleged fraud at an earlier period, and did not do so,
then it was laches and he could not recover. The beginning of the
plaintiff's knowledge was in 1862, when the first meeting was held to
-examine the boundaries ; in any event the account would be limited
to six years: Dean v. Thwaite, 21 Beav. 621; Lockey v. Lockey,
Prec. Ch. 518; South Sea Co. v. WRymondsell, 3 P. Wins. 143;
JHarcourtv. White, 28 Beav. 303; Trustees v. Gibbs, Law Rep.
1 H. L. 93, 126; Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Hurd, Law Rep. 5
C. P. 221 ; Bainbride on Mfines, 3d ed., p. 611.

